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ABSTRACT
By the conventional view, case outcomes are largely the product
of courts’ application of law to facts. Even when courts do not gener-
ate outcomes in this manner, prevailing legal theory casts them as the
arbiters of those outcomes. In a competing “strategic” view, lawyers
and parties construct legal outcomes in what amounts to a contest of
skill. Though the latter view better explains the process, no theory has
yet been propounded as to how lawyers can replace judges as arbiters.
This article propounds such a theory. It classifies legal strategies into
three types: those that require willing acceptance by judges, those that
constrain the actions of judges, and those that entirely deprive judges
of control.
Strategies that depend upon the persuasion of judges are ex-
plained through a conception of law in which cases and statutes are
almost wholly indeterminate and strategists infuse meaning into these
empty rules in the process of argumentation. Such meaning derives
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from social norms, patterns of outcomes, local practices and under-
standings, informal rules of factual inference, systems imperatives,
community expectations, and so-called “public policies.” Constraint
strategies operate through case selection, record-making, legal plan-
ning, or media pressure. Strategists deprive judges of control by fo-
rum shopping, by preventing cases from reaching decision, or by
causing them to be decided on issues other than the merits. The theory
presented explains how superior lawyering can determine outcomes,
why local legal cultures exist, how resources confer advantages in liti-
gation, and one of the means by which law evolves.
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If the judges say a contract with your buyer that he will not resell
below a certain price will be illegal, and not enforceable, if they are
likely to fine you or send you to jail for making such a contract, but
you still want your goods resold throughout the country at a single
price—what can you do? That is a problem for invention, for inge-
nuity; the problem of inventing a method of action which will keep
you free of difficulty and will produce the results you want in spite, if
you please, of what the judges in a case of dispute may be expected
to do.
Karl N. Llewellyn1
INTRODUCTION
In the conventional view of the legal process, courts determine
facts and then apply law to those facts to generate outcomes.2 In the
strict, formalist version of the conventional view, the law consists
principally of rules in which the outcomes of cases are already im-
1. THE BRAMBLE BUSH 14 (1960). Llewellyn’s reference was to statutes banning resale
price maintenance contracts. In those contracts, retailers agreed not to sell the manufacturer’s
product for a price less than that specified in the contract. See id.
2. The conventional view is typically described in terms such as these:
The common-law decisional process starts with the finding of facts in a dispute by a
fact-finder, be it a jury, judge, or administrative agency. Once the facts are ascer-
tained, the court compares them with fact patterns from previous cases and decides if
there is sufficient similarity to warrant applying the rule of an earlier case to the facts
of the present one.
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 2-4
(1992).
The breadth of acceptance of the conventional view is illustrated in Marc Galanter’s
classic article on why the “haves” come out ahead. Although Professor Galanter ultimately ar-
gues for a partially strategic explanation of case outcomes, he begins by starkly assuming the
conventional view as a frame of reference:
This society has a legal system in which a wide range of disputes and conflicts are set-
tled by court-like agencies which purport to apply pre-existing general norms impar-
tially (that is, unaffected by the identity of the parties). . . . The rules applied by the
courts are in part worked out in the process of adjudication (courts devise interstitial
rules, combine diverse rules, and apply old rules to new situations). There is a living
tradition of such rule-work and a system of communication such that the outcomes in
some of the adjudicated cases affect the outcome in classes of future adjudicated
cases.
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 96 (1974). That the primary objective of a player in Galanter’s model
is to win rules of law favorable to its side suggests their centrality.
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plicit.3 In the more popular version, the law is a mix of fixed rules and
flexible standards that sometimes permit courts to inquire into pur-
pose and to exercise judgment and discretion.4 In either version, the
conventional view holds written law to be an important determinant
of legal outcomes. To the extent that the conventional view acknowl-
edges written law to be ambiguous or indeterminate, it assumes, as
the original Realists did, that the effect is to lodge power in the
judges.5
By any version of the conventional view, the role of lawyers is
relatively minor. They gather facts, conduct research in the appropri-
ate legal materials, and then attempt to persuade the courts to reach
outcomes that favor their clients.6 In most disputes, no litigation will
be necessary; the written law will be sufficiently clear that the lawyers
will agree on what the outcome of litigation would be. In the vast
majority of the disputes that are litigated, the views of judges and ju-
ries will determine outcomes. Only in a small minority could lawyers
determine outcomes, and then only by persuading the judges or ju-
ries.
3. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 426-38 (1985) (arguing
that the textual language and precedent of the law limit its permissible interpretations). Bank-
man overstates the conventional view when he argues:
[A]cademics believe that the vast majority of issues can and should be decided with-
out recourse to legislative history or intent. Legislative intent or purpose becomes
relevant, however, in those situations in which the seemingly “plain language” of a
statute or rule admits more than one meaning, conflicts with the plain language of
other statutes or a body of well-accepted doctrine, or produces a nonsensical result.
Joseph Bankman, The Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Appropriate Response to Serious
Problem, 64 TAX NOTES 270, 271 (1994). But a substantial number of academics do hold these
beliefs, and probably most judges believe that they act in accord with them.
4. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
622, 623 (1999) (“‘Standards’ are laws that describe a triggering event in abstract terms that re-
fer to the ultimate policy or goal animating the law.”). Nearly all academics subscribe to one or
the other version of the conventional view. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 620 (1999) (“To be sure, as Hart and Sacks recognized, there is much at
stake in our age over whether the central products of our modern legal system—statutes—are
read literally or purposively.”).
5. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 842-47 (1935) (presenting a “theory of legal decisions” that assumes social
forces are given effect through the judge).
6. But see Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A Realist and Rhetoric-
Based Approach to Researching the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. REV. 285,
290-300 (1998) (rejecting formalism and proposing in consequence that law schools teach stu-
dents to research judges, lawyers, and other participants in litigation).
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Oddly, this conventional view coexists with another that sees the
legal process as highly manipulable through legal strategy.7 Star litiga-
tors—or “dream teams” of them—can regularly win judgments in
cases that have no merit,8 prevent meritorious cases from ever reach-
ing trial,9 turn victims into wrongdoers,10 and make the system set the
guilty free.11 Though some might dispute the particular examples of
manipulation that we give, the belief that strategies often determine
legal outcomes is widespread and generally consonant with the reality
of legal practice. Lawyers devote substantial time and energy to the
7. See, e.g., Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 566,
566 (1999) (presenting six “familiar examples” of controversial legal strategy); id. at 595 (con-
cluding that “[l]awyers routinely exploit law’s formality”).
As employed in this Article, “strategy” has been defined as “the art of devising or em-
ploying plans or stratagems toward a goal.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1162 (10th ed. 1996). A “stratagem” is “a cleverly contrived trick or scheme for
gaining an end.” Id.; see also 2 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY 1046 (1992) (“A strategy is a sequence of practices in
which base values are utilized to influence outcomes and effects.”).
8. For example, Dow Corning is settling the breast implant cases for over $2 billion even
though the scientific evidence seems clear that silicon cannot cause the injuries claimed. See
Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total Travesty? How the Battle over Breast Implants Took
Dow Corning to Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at D1 (stating that there is no scientific
evidence that implants cause serious disease). Securities class action lawyers have continued to
win cases despite legislation intended to thwart them. See, e.g., America’s Entrepreneurs Advo-
cate Securities Litigation Reform, BUS. WIRE, June 10, 1997 (“Congress in 1995 overwhelmingly
passed a sweeping measure that was intended to stop the filing of abusive securities class action
lawsuits in federal court. But some lawyers who specialize in these types of suits are thwarting
the 1995 law by filing them in state courts.”).
9. See generally, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (demonstrating that fi-
nancial pressures on plaintiffs’ attorneys made it virtually impossible for them to take a case to
trial).
10. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 46 (1996) (referring to
the American legal strategy of “attacking the victim’s character while keeping the defendant’s
prior record away from the jury”).
11. Only an omniscient observer could attest that a guilty person had been set free. But
skilled defense lawyers have freed defendants against whom the evidence could hardly have
been more compelling. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, The Dream Team, and
Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1996) (arguing that O.J.
Simpson’s lawyers did not act unethically in obtaining his acquittal even though the evidence
suggested guilt); Jay Mathews, DeLorean Acquitted of All Eight Charges in Drug-Scheme Trial,
WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1984, at A1 (reporting that John Z. DeLorean was acquitted of all
charges even though he was “caught on videotape discussing cocaine deals with government
agents posing as drug dealers”); John Needham, The Lure of Fame, Fortune; Bruce Cutler De-
fended a Mob Don; Now a High-Profile Case Brings Him West, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992, at E1
(noting that John Gotti, the head of the Gambino crime family, was acquitted all three times
that Bruce Cutler defended him but convicted in a case in which the court barred Cutler from
representation).
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development of legal strategies and regard them as capable of deter-
mining outcomes across a wide spectrum of cases. Even though the
best strategies are case-specific and must of necessity remain secret,
entire publications are devoted to those that are general and that law-
yers are willing to divulge.12
This Article argues that the strategic view captures the reality of
the legal process while the conventional view misses it. The unpleas-
ant implications that follow from the strategic view13 explain in part
why the conventional view has continued to dominate.14 But perhaps
an even greater impediment to recognition of the importance of legal
strategy has been the lack of a coherent theory to explain how law-
yers15 can overcome both law and judicial discretion to generate the
pattern of legal outcomes.
Legal strategy is curiously absent from the realm of legal theory.16
Extensive accounts of the adversary process do not even mention it.17
The law-and-society literature has explored differential case out-
12. See generally DAVID B. BAUM ET AL., ADVANCED NEGLIGENCE TRIAL STRATEGY 83-
98 (1979) (providing a sample opening statement presented in an actual products liability case);
XAVIER FRASCOGNA, NEGOTIATION STRATEGY FOR LAWYERS (1984) (providing “a compre-
hensive treatment of the various patterns, principles and techniques that govern negotiation in
the context of a law practice”); SIMON N. GAZAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TRIAL STRATEGY AND
TACTICS 75 (1962) (describing the importance of a trial lawyer’s knowledge of psychology to
defense jury selection strategy); CHARLES ROTHENBERG, MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION:
STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES (1972) (discussing strategies for selecting a jury that would likely
be more favorable to a plaintiff seeking divorce). There are also entire periodicals devoted to
legal strategy. See generally, e.g., BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST, COMPUTER LAW STRATEGIST,
CORPORATE TAX STRATEGY, THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGY IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION,
DEPOSITION STRATEGY: LAW AND FORMS, EMPLOYMENT LAW STRATEGIST, and
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIST.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Another part of the explanation is the understandable reluctance of lawyers who en-
gage in strategy to admit that they do so. The use of strategy is often condemned as unethical,
see infra Part V, and the articulation of strategy tends to destroy its effect, see infra note 210 and
accompanying text. Together, these two factors remove practicing lawyers—the persons most
knowledgeable about strategy—from the discussion of its role in the legal system.
15. Sophisticated parties sometimes devise and manage the execution of legal strategies,
but the large majority are devised and executed by lawyers. Our references solely to lawyers as
the initiators throughout this Article should be understood to include parties to the extent of
their participation.
16. But see 2 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 7, at 1067-73 (listing strategic decisions
made by lawyers during litigation); Katz, supra note 7, passim (arguing that strategy operates in
the realm of law in essentially the same manner that it operates in the realm of morality).
17. See, e.g., Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1161 (1958) (distinguishing vigorous advocacy from “muddy[ing] the headwaters of decision”).
But see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 82-90
(1949) (describing adversarial presentation in terms of strategy and tactics).
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comes extensively,18 but aside from the exploration of case-selection
strategy initiated by Galanter,19 has not attempted to explain how le-
gal strategy could generate them.
Strategy plays a central role in three methodologies employed in
law and economics: economic modeling, game theory, and gaming.
But the strategy explored by law-and-economics scholars is funda-
mentally different from that practiced by lawyers. The economic actor
either yields to the rule of law and seeks maximum advantage under
it, or violates the rule and accepts the consequences.20 The legal
strategist, by contrast, often seeks to defeat the rule of law in a man-
ner that avoids the penalty as well. To make the same point another
way, the economic model treats the lawmaker—like the game de-
signer—as omnipotent.21 In that model, players cannot challenge the
rules; they can only seek advantage under them. Yet a central thrust
of legal strategy is to control legal outcomes despite the contrary in-
tentions of legislators or judges.22
This Article seeks to explain the relationship between law,
judges, and legal strategy, and in so doing, to offer a theory that ex-
plains what lawyers do when they strategize. The principal task, as we
see it, is to generalize from what seems to be an infinite number of
imaginative, clever, fact-specific maneuvers to a theory of what strat-
egy is and how strategy can defeat both the rules of law and the
judges who interpret those rules. As part of that task, we attempt to
distinguish the strategic perspective from competing perspectives, to
identify the materials from which lawyers construct their strategies,23
18. See Donald Farole, Reexamining Litigant Success, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming
Sept. 2000) (reviewing the literature). This literature often refers to “legal strategy” as the
means by which skilled lawyers influence outcome, but it does not attempt to explain what the
skilled lawyers do to influence outcome. See, e.g., Steven C. Tauber, The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Racial Discrimination Decision Making, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 325,
326 (1999) (referring to “skillful legal argument” and “compelling legal argument”).
19. See supra note 2; infra Part III.B.1. Legal strategy is not, of course, the only thing that
may be in the black box driving outcomes.
20. Professor Cynthia Williams has dubbed this view the “law as price” view of law and
criticized it as an attitude toward compliance. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with
the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1267-68 (1998). The point we make here
is unaffected by hers.
21. See Kaushik Basu, The Role of Norms and Law in Economics: An Essay of Political
Economy 15-17 (Dec. 10, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(arguing that judges should be regarded as players in the economic game).
22. See, e.g., Meacham Corp. v. United States, 207 F.2d 535, 544 (4th Cir. 1953) (“[T]hey
employed the New York lawyers to find a way through the stone wall of the statutes . . . .”).
23. See infra Part II.
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to catalogue the variety of legal strategies they construct,24 and to ex-
plore the implications of our theory.25
Our theory can be summarized as follows: “Law” has direct ef-
fect through the rendition and enforcement of judgments in actual
cases and indirect effect through the anticipation of such rendition
and enforcement in hypothetical cases. Each such case is a complex
undertaking that may require hundreds of strategic decisions by the
parties and generate an indefinite number of actual or potential legal
issues and extra-legal problems. The “merits” of the case, as conven-
tionally conceived, may be only one among them.26 Each of those de-
cisions, issues, and problems is potentially outcome-determinative.
The odds that any one will determine the outcome are small. But cu-
mulatively, the odds that some combination of these decisions, issues,
and problems will determine the outcome are large. The legal strate-
gist manipulates those odds in a game of skill, expanding and devel-
oping the array of decisions, issues, and problems in a manner calcu-
lated to confuse and ultimately overwhelm the opponent.27 Even if the
“merits” should ever reach a decisionmaker, it will be a decision-
maker identified by the game, and the “merits” will reach that deci-
sionmaker in a form determined by the game.
We assume that courts are generally hostile to legal strategy and
will seek to nullify it when they can. In contrast to prominent scholars
who consider formalism a precondition to strategy,28 we assume a
thoroughly realist concept of law that leaves to judges a broad range
of freedom in their decisionmaking. Still, we conclude that, within the
wide range of what is culturally acceptable in legal outcomes, legal
strategies are the primary determinants of who will decide cases, un-
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. Whether an issue constitutes the merits or is merely procedural or tangential is itself
frequently the subject of legal strategy.
27. See, e.g., Ann Davis, How a Lawyer Turned Tables in Tobacco Case, WALL ST. J., Oct.
4, 1999, at B1 (noting a speech by tobacco company lawyer William Hendricks III “about how
prosecutors can be ‘mortally wounded’ when they decide to skirmish over legal and factual is-
sues in court before indictments are handed up”); John Gibeaut, Another Broken Trust, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1999, at 40, 41 (describing the Indian trust case as “spinning out of control” as a result
of discovery decisions and missed strategic opportunities). To the extent that cases are decided
on the merits, they cannot “spin out of control” before their conclusion. Nor can an agreement
to give discovery compromise them in any way.
28. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Formalism and the Red-Hot Knife, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
597, 604 (1999) (“A formalistic system puts a great premium on people (particularly lawyers)
who are able to invent clever ways to manipulate the rules to produce desired outcomes.”);
Katz, supra note 7, at 595 (“Lawyers routinely exploit law’s formality.”).
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der what constraints, and with what consequences. Written law is just
one of several kinds of normative material the system uses, and it is
not even the most important.
Part I of this Article uses the Texaco-Pennzoil case29 to illustrate
how the strategic perspective we advocate differs from the conven-
tional perspective and then distinguishes our strategic perspective
from that employed in law and economics. Part II of this Article be-
gins by defining the terms we use to refer to various concepts of law
and strategy. Part II then describes the fluid nature of legal doctrine
that renders it displaceable by social norms and the prejudices of the
decisionmaker and explains how the strategist exploits those norms
and prejudices. Lastly, Part II notes the residual role of legal doctrine
in a world dominated by strategy. Building on the theory propounded
in Part II, Part III employs three main categories to catalogue the
wide variety of activities referred to as “legal strategy”: strategies that
seek to persuade the judge, strategies that seek to constrain the judge,
and strategies that seek to strip the judge—and the law—of all power
over case outcome. Part IV identifies the principal implications of the
theory we propose. Our theory explains why strategy can so dramati-
cally affect legal outcomes, how strategy drives changes in law, the
source and mechanisms of the set of variations in law commonly re-
ferred to as “legal culture,” and why ingenuity and resources together
are so effective in determining legal outcomes. Part V concludes that
strategy, not law, is the principal determinant of legal outcomes, that
awareness of strategy is likely to increase with growing public access
to data on legal outcomes, and that legal systems should be redes-
igned consciously to minimize strategic opportunities.
At the same time, the theory we present does not depend upon a
high level of indeterminacy in legal rules. Merely assuming that there
is indeterminacy on some issues provides the flexibility necessary to
render the ultimate outcomes of nearly all cases indeterminate. Small
amounts of indeterminacy on each of the numerous issues that consti-
tute a case combine to generate large amounts of potential variance in
outcomes.30
29. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 784-87 (Tex. App.), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1
(1987).
30. One of us has argued elsewhere that “[t]he outcome of a case can be predicted more
accurately at the level of the whole case than at the level of the case-dispositive decisions within
the case that supposedly produce the outcome.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strat-
egy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1527 (1996). This “whole-case
realism” puts a damper on what can be accomplished through legal strategy. It is also worth
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I.  THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE DISTINGUISHED
The first step in understanding the strategic perspective we pro-
mote is to distinguish it from both the conventional perspective and
the strategic perspective sometimes employed in law and economics.
A. The Texaco-Pennzoil Case as Illustration
To frame the conflict between the strategic and conventional
views of the legal process, consider their application to the struggle
between Texaco and Pennzoil over Getty Oil. Recall that, in the con-
ventional view, legal problems are resolved by the application of law
to the facts of cases. That view recognizes that legal procedures are
necessary to make the application, and reluctantly acknowledges that
such procedures can be outcome-determinative. But it assumes that
judges control outcomes and that they decide the vast majority of
cases on their “merits.”31
A conventional account of the Texaco-Pennzoil case would pro-
ceed something like this: Pennzoil negotiated an “agreement in prin-
ciple” to purchase Getty Oil. That agreement in principle was ap-
proved by Getty’s board, but while the remaining terms of the written
agreement were being negotiated and drafted, Texaco persuaded
Getty to sell to Texaco rather than Pennzoil.32 The legal theory of the
Houston, Texas, action that resulted in the $10.53 billion judgment33
was tortious interference with contract. After the parties presented
the facts to the jury, the court charged the jury to decide whether
Getty and Pennzoil “intended to bind themselves” to an agreement,
whether Texaco interfered with that agreement, and if so, the amount
of Pennzoil’s damages.34 The jury concluded that Getty and Pennzoil
did intend to bind themselves to an agreement, that Texaco interfered
with that agreement, and that Pennzoil was damaged in the amount of
$7.53 billion dollars.35 The jury assessed an additional $3 billion in pu-
noting that the predictions of whole-case realism referred to are not made from law, but from
community expectations regarding outcomes.
31. See authorities cited supra notes 3-5.
32. See Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 784-87 (describing the facts of the case).
33. The amount of the jury verdict was $10.53 billion. The amounts of the verdict, judg-
ment, and bond are referred to below in amounts that range from $10 billion to $12 billion. The
variation results from a reduction in amount by the Texas Court of Appeals, an increase in the
amount through the accrual of interest, and rounding by various commentators.
34. THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL & HONOR 391-92 (1987).
35. See Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 784.
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nitive damages.36 On appeal, the court reduced the punitive damages
to $1 billion but upheld the remainder of the judgment.37 The judg-
ment supposedly bankrupted Texaco, which was then able to survive
only by settling with Pennzoil for a cash payment of $3 billion.38 The
bankruptcy and $3 billion payment were the consequences of the ap-
plication of law to the facts of the case.
The strategic view provides a markedly different account of the
Texaco-Pennzoil litigation. In the strategic view, legal outcomes are
the product of complex strategic interaction designed to control out-
comes by manipulating the environments in which the outcomes are
determined. Strategically-minded lawyers devise and execute plans
for reaching their goals. The lawyers’ roles are, in the strategic view,
primary; they decide when, by whom, and under what constraints le-
gal issues are resolved. The judges’ roles are secondary; they decide
only what they are asked to decide, and within the constraints im-
posed by the strategists.39 Finally, the strategic view is phenomenol-
ogical; it seeks to explain outcomes by examination of the strategies
employed.
A strategic account of Texaco-Pennzoil would proceed some-
thing like this: Pennzoil initially brought three legal actions seeking to
block Texaco’s deal with Getty Oil. First, it sued Texaco and Getty in
the Delaware Chancery Court seeking an injunction against the deal.40
Second, while that lawsuit was pending, Pennzoil filed an antitrust ac-
tion against Texaco in Tulsa, Oklahoma.41 The Tulsa filing was re-
markable because neither Texaco nor Pennzoil was incorporated or
headquartered in Oklahoma. Commentators speculated that Pennzoil
chose Tulsa because the atmosphere there had been poisoned against
takeovers by Occidental Petroleum’s recently completed takeover of
Tulsa-based Cities Service Company,42 or because of the political and
economic connections of Pennzoil CEO Hugh Liedtke’s family to
36. See id.
37. See id. at 866.
38. See Allanna Sullivan, Texaco’s War with Pennzoil Ends Officially, WALL ST. J., Mar.
24, 1988, at 3.
39. We do not discuss the strategic manipulation of juries because the conventional view
already acknowledges it. On jury manipulation in Texaco, see Walter O. Weyrauch, Unwritten
Constitutions, Unwritten Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1211, 1232-37 (1999).
40. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 241-42.
41. See id. at 248.
42. See id. (“[Pennzoil’s] lawyers figured that the loss of independence by one of Tulsa’s
biggest and most-loved companies might dispose the judiciary unfavorably toward Texaco’s
megadeal.”).
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Tulsa.43 (At the same time, Pennzoil surreptitiously financed another
antitrust action against Texaco—this one by a small heating oil and
gasoline distributor in a federal court in Providence, Rhode Island.44)
Probably none of the parties thought that any of these cases would go
to trial; they were “tactical cases” filed to generate leverage, what one
commentator called “the inevitable postscript to a high-stakes merger
game.”45 From a strategic perspective, Pennzoil was searching for a
court receptive to its goal—unraveling Texaco’s deal with Getty.
Each new case Pennzoil filed was another chance to find a court in-
clined to grant Pennzoil a remedy. The particular cause of action was
of secondary importance. If one lawsuit seemed promising, Pennzoil
could pursue it and dismiss or abandon the others.
Pennzoil’s third legal action sought an injunction in the Houston,
Texas, court; it was this action that eventually gave Pennzoil its $10.53
billion dollar verdict against Texaco. The Houston court was a strate-
gic afterthought, selected in a conversation between Pennzoil CEO
Hugh Liedtke and his friend Joe Jamail, a Texas personal injury law-
yer, after Pennzoil had filed the same cause of action in Delaware.46
To file that cause of action in Texas, Pennzoil first had to dismiss the
Delaware action. Pennzoil could dismiss as of right if it did so before
Texaco filed an answer.47 If Pennzoil did not dismiss before Texaco
filed an answer, Pennzoil could have dismissed only with leave of
court, which probably would not have been granted.48 Had Texaco an-
ticipated that Pennzoil would decide to switch courts, it could easily
have filed that answer.49 Texaco’s failure to file that answer became
known later as the “10 billion dollar boo boo.”50
43. See, e.g., Walt Harrington, Born to Run: On the Privilege of Being George Bush, WASH.
POST MAGAZINE, Sept. 28, 1986, at W16 (noting that Liedtke’s father was Gulf Oil’s chief coun-
sel in Tulsa and that Liedtke raised money in Tulsa for an investment with George Bush).
44. See STEVE COLL, THE TAKING OF GETTY OIL 383 (1987) (referring to the Oklahoma
and Rhode Island suits as “sponsored private antitrust suits”); PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 249
(reporting that Pennzoil had given Fairlawn Oil Service $50,000 to file the Rhode Island case).
45. COLL, supra note 44, at 384.
46. See id. at 385-86.
47. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 261.
48. Leave probably would not have been granted for two reasons. First, Texaco would have
filed an answer before the hearing, thereby joining the issue. Second, Pennzoil’s dismissal was
merely for the purpose of refiling in another court after losing the initial hearing in the Dela-
ware court—an obvious instance of forum shopping.
49. See COLL, supra note 44, at 387 (discussing the failure to file the answer and noting that
an experienced attorney could have dictated it in thirty minutes).
50. Id. at 386.
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
2000] A THEORY OF LEGAL STRATEGY 1417
Pennzoil made the strategic decision to capitalize ruthlessly on
Texaco’s error. Deliberately ignoring a local custom that required
Pennzoil to give Texaco notice of its intent to dismiss and an oppor-
tunity to prevent dismissal by filing the answer, Pennzoil dismissed
without prior notice to Texaco.51 Fifteen minutes later, Pennzoil re-
filed in Texas.52
The strategic perspective recognizes the pivotal importance of
Pennzoil’s decision not to give notice. If Pennzoil had given notice,
Texaco almost certainly would have filed an answer. If Texaco had
filed an answer, the case would have remained in Delaware where
Pennzoil probably could not have won53 and certainly could not have
won more than about $800 million.54 The conventional perspective re-
gards Pennzoil’s decision as a matter of little or no importance to the
outcome. Under the conventional perspective, the decision permitted
Pennzoil to proceed in a different court, but that court would, under
conflicts rules, be bound to apply the same law.55
The Texas case was assigned to Judge Anthony Farris.56 Two
days after the assignment, Joe Jamail, then Pennzoil’s lead counsel in
the case, donated $10,000 to Judge Farris’ reelection campaign.57 Tex-
aco’s motion to recuse on the basis of the contribution was denied.58
51. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 261 (referring to the rule permitting dismissal with-
out notice as “seldom-used”).
52. See id. at 384 (characterizing the decision to bring the Texas case as virtually an after-
thought).
53. Pennzoil’s case has generally been acknowledged to have been weak on the merits and
to have succeeded only because it was tried to a populist Texas jury. See, e.g., Michael Ansaldi,
Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of the Masses: A Contracts Postmortem, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 733,
834-40 (1990).
54. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 784
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) (“This Court therefore believes that the compensatory damages which
flow from this breach of contract, tortiously induced by Texaco, should in no event exceed $800
Million.”).
55. Pennzoil’s case against Texaco proceeded in Texas on the assumption that New York
law applied. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 858 (Tex. App.), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1
(1987) (“In the instant case, there is no dispute that the governing substantive law was New
York law.”). The strategic view recognizes that conflict of laws is only a marginally useful con-
cept. Texas courts might state that they apply New York law, but they respond principally to the
factors described in Part II.B, which are local. See Weyrauch, Unwritten Law, supra note 39, at
1233.
56. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 282.
57. See id. Jamail contributed another $10,000 to the campaign of the administrative judge
with supervisory power over Farris. Jamail’s other contributions—to seventeen other judges—
totaled less than $13,000. See id. at 288.
58. See id. at 290-91.
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Jamail’s generosity seemed to be rewarded with an almost continuous
stream of rulings in Pennzoil’s favor.59 Because such contributions do
not meet the doctrinal standards of a bribe, conventional theory
maintains the fiction that they have no impact on outcomes,60 but the
actions of the parties show that they regarded the contribution as stra-
tegically important.61
Still considering Pennzoil’s case weak as to liability at the close of
evidence, Texaco chose not to dignify it by presenting evidence re-
garding damages.62 Texaco’s strategy was carefully considered63 and is
not without its defenders today.64 But its effect was to leave the jury
with only Pennzoil’s evidence regarding damages once they had found
liability.65 Commentators generally regard the $7.53 billion compensa-
tory portion of the verdict as grossly in excess of Pennzoil’s actual
damages66 and attribute it to what can be seen in hindsight as Texaco’s
strategic error.67 The conventional perspective, by contrast, would
mask Texaco’s strategic disaster with the homily that if each side in an
adversary proceeding presents the evidence that is to its advantage,
the truth will emerge.
59. See id. at 285-374; id. at 289 (“[E]very single pretrial ruling that Miller [Texaco’s lead
attorney] could think of had gone Pennzoil’s way.”).
60. But see generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, When is a Campaign Contribution a Bribe?
(1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (taking the position that
the kind of campaign contribution made by Jamail and accepted by Farris is arguably criminal).
61. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 288-91 (describing the court fight over the contribu-
tion).
62. See id. at 388-89.
63. See id. at 384-85, 389 (discussing Texaco’s cautious decision).
64. See, e.g., Janet Elliott, Lasting Impact; Legal Anomaly; A Look Back at the Real Trial
of the Century, TEX. LAW., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1 (describing and defending the decision).
65. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 403-04 (describing the jury deliberation on damages).
66. See id. at 321 (describing the illogic of Pennzoil’s damage calculation and referring to it
as “outrageous”).
67. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the
Benedectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 56 n.248 (1993) (“In hindsight, Texaco’s failure to present
damages evidence was unwise and could only be justified by a particularly uncomplimentary
view of the jury’s decisionmaking capacity.”); How Texaco Lost Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1985, at D1 (stating that Texaco attorney Richard B. Miller acknowledges that his decision
not to put on damage evidence “has since drawn a torrent of criticism”); Tamar Lewin, Penn-
zoil-Texaco Fight Raised Key Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1987, at A44 (quoting Columbia
law professor Harvey Goldschmid as saying that “[o]ne area that was obviously a mistake was
Texaco’s failure to deal with evidence of damages at trial”). But see Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
729 S.W.2d 768, 859-63 (Tex. App.), rev’d 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (concluding that the damage evi-
dence presented by Pennzoil was sufficient to support the verdict).
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After the verdict, Texaco launched a media campaign seeking to
convince the public that Texaco “could crumble under the weight of
the history-making verdict unless [the Texaco trial judge] lifted the
threat.”68 The obvious purpose of the campaign was to affect the
courts’ future rulings, even though the conventional perspective rec-
ognizes no means by which that could occur.69
As the court was poised to enter a judgment that would place
liens on property owned by Texaco, Texaco transferred one of the
world’s largest refineries and a chemical plant to subsidiaries that
would not be liable for the judgment.70 The conventional analysis of
such a transfer is that it is fraudulent and voidable if Texaco made it
with the “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” Pennzoil, or if
Texaco made it in exchange for less than “reasonably equivalent
value” while insolvent.71 In a creditor’s action, the court would declare
it void. The conventional analysis was, however, of little relevance be-
cause the mere transfer itself accomplished Texaco’s objective: to
keep record title clear of the judgment lien that would automatically
take effect on entry of the judgment, and thereby prevent Pennzoil
from gaining potentially outcome-determinative leverage. Pennzoil
would have to take some additional legal action to nullify the transfer
before its lien could attach.
Texaco’s remaining property in the state continued to be subject
to the threat of such liens. As a result, Texaco again faced a crisis on
the day the Texas judge was to decide whether to impose liens on
Texaco’s remaining property within the state. Fearing that the judge
might issue an adverse ruling from the bench, Texaco put in place an
elaborate mechanism to enable it to obtain an automatic stay of such
a ruling by filing for bankruptcy in White Plains, New York, during
the few minutes between the judge’s announcement of his ruling and
Pennzoil’s recordation of it.72 Imposition of the liens, which would
68. PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 417.
69. The campaign appears to have made an impression on Chief District Judge Brieant. See
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 252 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.
1986) (describing the court’s receipt of numerous letters from Congressmen and Senators, along
with amicus curiae briefs from several states).
70. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 430; see also id. at 434 (“A Texaco executive later
swore in an affidavit that the refinery switch was a long-planned move intended as part of a plan
to consolidate the assets of Getty Oil.”).
71. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1999) (outlining, in the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, situations in which debtors’ transfers to creditors are fraudulent).
72. See Thomas Petzinger et al., High-Stakes Poker: Texaco and Pennzoil, with Truce Ex-
piring, Again Talk of Settling, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1986, at A1.
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have occurred immediately on recordation, might have severely dis-
rupted Texaco’s business, giving Pennzoil sufficient leverage to force
Texaco to abandon its appeals.73
When the Houston, Texas, court entered judgment for Pennzoil
(without imposing the liens), Texaco instead responded by filing a
civil action in the United States district court in White Plains, New
York. By that action, Texaco sought to remove authority over the
case from the Texas state court and reverse the result.74 The strategic
theory was that the Texas courts were prejudiced in favor of Pennzoil
(the Texas company) and Joe Jamail (a personal friend of the judge).
In contrast, the New York courts would presumably be prejudiced in
favor of Texaco (the New York company), and the petition would be
presented by a lawyer who knew the New York judge personally.75
Initially, the strategy worked. The New York judge reduced Texaco’s
appeal bond from $11 billion to $1 billion,76 opined that the Texas
judgment was several times larger than what was appropriate,77 and
suggested that if the Texas court did not set it aside, he might.78 Penn-
zoil’s appeal of the New York ruling to the Second Circuit was ac-
companied by another intense lobbying campaign in both the state
capitals and Washington.79 The Second Circuit affirmed the bond re-
duction.80
On April 6, 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed, ruling that Texaco would have to comply with the Texas $11
73. Bankruptcy would have been less effective if filed after imposition of the liens. For ex-
ample, the liens would have constituted a default in some of Texaco’s obligations, activating
contractual default rates of interest.
74. See Texaco Inc., 626 F. Supp. at 251-52; PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 438.
75. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 440.
76. See Texaco Inc., 626 F. Supp. at 262.
77. See id. at 255 (“This Court therefore believes that the compensatory damages which
flow from this breach of contract, tortiously induced by Texaco, should in no event exceed $800
Million . . . .”).
78. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 448 (“If Texaco failed to reverse the actual judgment
in the Texas appellate courts, the [New York federal judge] indicated he might do it himself,
taking the entire case into his own hands.”); see also Texaco Inc., 626 F. Supp. at 259 (“[E]ven if
the Judgment ripened into a final judgment in this vast amount of money, and assuming all deci-
sions down the road go against Texaco, Texaco would still have the federal claims that are
pleaded in this action, which it could litigate on the merits.”). In the New York action, Texaco
pled five constitutional and statutory bases for the district court to nullify the Texas judgment.
See id. at 251. To concern oneself with whether the claims were “right” or “in accord with the
law” is to miss the point. A technically adequate basis exists for virtually any action a court may
choose to take. The only effective limit is the cultural acceptability of the results.
79. See PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 449.
80. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986).
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billion bond requirement to pursue its appeal further.81 Although
Texaco could have posted the bond82 or waited for a ruling on the
bond from the Texas Court of Appeals, it chose instead to file bank-
ruptcy in White Plains, New York.83 The immediate effect of the
bankruptcy was to permit Texaco to continue pursuing its appeals
without liquidating assets or posting the bond.84
Absent a bankruptcy filing, Texaco could have pursued its ap-
peals only by posting an $11 billion bond; with the bankruptcy filing,
Texaco was able to pursue its appeals without posting any bond at all.
The conventional view justifies these starkly different entitlements
with the theory that, first, bankrupt companies present different pol-
icy considerations that require different outcomes; and second, the
courts control access to bankruptcy through the doctrine barring “bad
faith filings.”85 To put it another way, Texaco did not have a choice
between posting the bond and filing bankruptcy; if Texaco was not
bankrupt, it had to post the bond, but if it was bankrupt, it did not.
That perspective obscures the strategic nature of Texaco’s deci-
sion. Texaco was not “bankrupt” in any common sense of the term.
Its net worth was probably in the range of $22 billion to $26 billion—
easily enough to pay the $10 billion judgment.86 To justify the bank-
ruptcy, Texaco launched a public relations campaign that one ob-
81. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) .
82. See KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY 137-41 (discussing Texaco’s ability
to post the bond). Although the amount of the bond exceeded world bonding capacity at that
time, Texaco could have liquidated assets sufficient to post the bond in cash. And although
those assets might not have fetched the best possible price under the circumstances, there is no
suggestion that the proceeds of sale would have been insufficient to meet the full amount of the
bond. See infra note 86. Texaco had 17 months from the verdict in November 1985 to the bank-
ruptcy filing in April 1987 to initiate such sales.
83. See DELANEY, supra note 82, at 146 (“Texaco’s favorable balance sheet left many per-
forming ‘linguistic contortions’ trying to explain why the company was in bankruptcy.”).
84. See id. at 144-46.
85. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 984-89 (1991)
(discussing the doctrine barring bad faith filings and whether Texaco filed in good faith).
86. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1155 (2d Cir. 1986) (“In the present case
there is no serious dispute that, should Texaco be required to liquidate its substantial assets, it
would be able to pay Pennzoil’s judgment in full.”); DELANEY, supra note 82, at 146 (projecting
Texaco’s liquidation value somewhere between $22 billion and $26 billion); PETZINGER, supra
note 34, at 441 (estimating a $26 billion net worth); Thomas C. Hayes, Pennzoil’s Chances Un-
clear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1987, at D1 (“Pennzoil and Texaco agreed in court documents filed
in Houston last week that Texaco’s total assets, more than $34 billion, were more than adequate
to pay $10 billion to Pennzoil if Texaco loses its appeals.”).
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server dubbed a “linguistic strategy.”87 In that campaign, Texaco ar-
gued that it was financially impractical for it to post the bond, even
though it was financially possible for it to do so.88 For reasons never
made public, but which may also have been of a strategic nature,
Pennzoil did not raise the bad faith filing issue in the bankruptcy
case.89
The substantive law of bankruptcy offered Texaco no advantage
against Pennzoil; because Texaco was solvent, bankruptcy law enti-
tled Pennzoil to payment in full.90 The predominant and perhaps sole91
purpose of the bankruptcy appears to have been to create a delay that
would enable Texaco to pursue its appeals.92 Bankruptcy’s “automatic
stay” prevented Pennzoil from enforcing its judgment while the case
remained pending.93 If it remained pending long enough, Texaco
might be able to finish its appeals, and in the meantime, Pennzoil
would get no money.94
It was also possible that something benefiting Texaco might hap-
pen during the delay, and something almost did. The Securities Ex-
change Commission “gave Texaco a big boost” in its position by an-
nouncing that it would file a brief in the Texaco appeal arguing that
87. DELANEY, supra note 82, at 167-68.
88. See id. at 167 (“Texaco continually argued that paying the damages was not financially
impossible, but rather ‘financially impracticable.’”).
89. One possibility was fear that litigation over whether the filing was in good faith would
itself delay the bankruptcy case. That appears to have occurred in the Manville bankruptcy. See
In re Johns-Manville, 42 B.R. 654, 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying leave to take an inter-
locutory appeal regarding the issue of good faith filing because the appeal itself would further
delay the case).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1994) (giving unsecured creditors absolute priority over
shareholders as a condition for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan).
91. A second objective may have been to change fora, and with it, judges. But at this late
stage of the litigation, there was probably little that a new judge could have done for Texaco
except delay. Cf. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 24 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“[T]he odor of impermissible forum shopping . . . pervades this case.”).
92. See DELANEY, supra note 82, at 146 (“Even Texaco admitted that the bankruptcy filing
was mainly a strategic effort to delay paying the Pennzoil court award.”); Robert H. Mnookin &
Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Tex-
aco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 324-29 (1989) (suggesting that Texaco’s managers sought delay in
bankruptcy as a means of leveraging releases of their liability to Texaco’s shareholders for the
events leading to the judgment).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994) (providing that petitions filed under §§ 301, 302, and 303
of this title automatically operate as a stay).
94. See DELANEY, supra note 82, at 154-59 (explaining the leverage Texaco gained by its
bankruptcy filing).
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Pennzoil had broken SEC rules in its bid for Getty.95 Ultimately, de-
spite the SEC’s support, the court ruled against Texaco.
The final resolution of the case—settlement for a cash payment
of $3 billion—was precipitated by a procedural decision of the bank-
ruptcy court. After the Texas Supreme Court upheld the verdict, the
bankruptcy court modified Texaco’s exclusive right to file a Chapter
11 plan. Such modification effectively permitted Pennzoil to settle the
case with the creditors and equity committees if they could not settle
it with Texaco’s management.96 Faced with the possibility that the
case would be settled without them, Texaco’s managers settled
quickly. Even so, the settlement was well below the expected value of
the judgment in litigation under an economic analysis,97 suggesting
that other, not-yet-revealed factors held down the amount.98
By condemning legal action taken solely for the purpose of de-
lay—a behavior the courts have no practical means of controlling—
the law conveniently escapes responsibility for Texaco’s strategic suc-
cess in delaying enforcement of Pennzoil’s judgment. Either Texaco
had some reason other than delay for filing the bankruptcy (which
95. Id. at 149.
96. See In re Texaco Inc., 90 B.R. 622, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988):
The settlement was arrived at when this court permitted the equity holders committee
and the creditors committee to negotiate directly with Pennzoil, with the under-
standing that if a settlement figure was mutually agreed upon, the court would termi-
nate Texaco’s exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization and would entertain
a competing plan proposed by the statutory committees and Pennzoil.
97. See Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 92, at 298 (noting that Texaco’s only chance for re-
versal of the judgment was the Supreme Court of the United States, and noting that, “[a]ll
things considered, it is difficult to see how either side could have thought that the odds of the
Supreme Court granting certiorari were better than fifty-fifty”). Because Texaco could have
been liquidated for enough money to pay all of its creditors in full, Pennzoil had the right under
bankruptcy law to be paid the full amount of its judgment with interest. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7) (1994) (establishing the “confirmation of plan” with respect to each impaired class
of claims or interests); id. § 726(a)(5) (explaining that property of the estate shall be distributed
“in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date” the petition was filed). Thus, the only
way to derive an expectancy value for the judgment of less than half the more than $10 billion
owed at the time of the settlement was to assume that the managers of Texaco could and would
destroy the company before allowing it to pay the expectancy value of the company in settle-
ment. See Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 92, at 324-29 (suggesting that Texaco’s managers were
willing to destroy the company because of their conflict of interest with it, but not explaining
why the bankruptcy court would have allowed such action).
98. Another possibility is simply the fear that circumstances not yet known to Pennzoil
would prevent its realization on the judgment. In a world where outcomes are determined by
legal doctrine, that would be unlikely, but not in a world where outcomes are determined prin-
cipally by strategy.
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might be known only to Texaco)99 or Texaco’s success was achieved
unethically and illegally (in which case Pennzoil is at fault for not
making appropriate objections).100 By contrast, the strategic perspec-
tive acknowledges that illegal strategies work in circumstances where
the remedies available on paper do not.
The conventional view obscures the determinants of the outcome
in Pennzoil versus Texaco by seeing the outcome as merely a question
of the “proper” interpretation of ambiguous events—was the original
agreement in principle between Pennzoil and Getty a contract?101 The
interpretation itself was an unverifiable process occurring in the
minds of judges and jurors and hence was beyond effective examina-
tion or criticism.
By contrast, the strategic view demonstrates that the outcome in
Pennzoil versus Texaco was highly serendipitous, and that each side
had more than one opportunity to win by taking the right action at
the right time.102 Texaco might have won by answering the Delaware
complaint and objecting to voluntary dismissal, by presenting damage
evidence to the Texas jury, or by reincorporating in New York so it
could remove the Texas action to federal court. Pennzoil might have
won by persuading the court to dismiss Texaco’s bankruptcy as a bad
faith filing103—leaving Texaco at its mercy—or by demanding its right
99. Texaco was having difficulty placing its commercial paper, but that liquidity crisis was
one of its own making.
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 cmt. (1999) (“Delay should
not be indulged . . . for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful
redress or repose.”).
101. Applying the conventional view, Professor Ansaldi determined that the case was incor-
rectly decided and blamed the error on the jury. See Ansaldi, supra note 53, at 834.
102. See, e.g., DELANEY, supra note 82, at 158 (noting that Texaco’s $10 billion judgment
was “treated throughout the [bankruptcy] case as ‘incorrect,’ ‘absurd,’ and a bargaining chip”).
103. See id. (“Whether Texaco ever belonged in bankruptcy remains a contentious issue.”);
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 85, at 938-39:
The most notorious of the litigation tactic cases involve petitions filed with the evi-
dent intention to circumvent state law requirements regarding the posting of a super-
sedes bond as a condition to appealing an adverse judgment. Texaco’s much-
publicized Chapter 11 filing in the wake of Pennzoil’s nearly $12 billion judgment
against it is certainly the most striking example of this type of situation.
Panel Discussion and Question-Answer Session, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 574 (1992) (quoting the
statement of law professor John D. Ayer that he could not “think of any conventional theory at
all under which Texaco deserved to be in bankruptcy when you recognize that they could have
paid every penny of that judgment as it was originally cast, and so there would have been money
left over for equity”).
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
2000] A THEORY OF LEGAL STRATEGY 1425
to absolute priority for the full amount of its judgment in the bank-
ruptcy court.104
Settlement of the Texaco-Pennzoil case for about a third of the
amount awarded by the jury is consistent with the conventional view
that Pennzoil had a weak case on the “merits”—the facts and the law.
But the strategic analysis set forth here shows that to be mere coinci-
dence. Pennzoil had overcome most of the conventional weaknesses
of its case by winning the judgment and carrying it through the first
two levels of appeal.105 Had it pursued the bankruptcy case, it might
have taken ownership and control of Texaco, a $26 billion prize.106
The weaknesses in Pennzoil’s case that remained and shaped the
terms of settlement had little or nothing to do with the merits of its
initial case as seen from the conventional perspective.
B. Legal Strategy in Law-and-Economics Theory
As noted in the Introduction, the kind of legal strategy we seek
to explain—the kind practiced by lawyers—is curiously absent from
current legal theory. Strategy does play a prominent role in three
branches of economic theory: economic modeling, game theory, and
gaming. Only in the third, little-used branch of the three applications,
however, does the strategy employed at all resemble the type prac-
ticed by lawyers and explored in this Article.
Economic modeling is grounded in the conception of persons as
“rational maximizer[s] . . . of ‘self-interest.’”107 The choices these ra-
tional maximizers make are often strategic—in the sense that they are
plans for reaching goals—and they are commonly referred to as
104. Pennzoil might have implemented this strategy during the bankruptcy case by asserting
that Texaco was insolvent and by demanding, as the real party in interest, the right to control
Texaco and thus determine its legal strategy during bankruptcy. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Wil-
liam C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 742-47 (1993) (presenting empirical evidence that
creditors succeeded in exercising hegemony over the management of insolvent debtors during
reorganization). Texaco may have had difficulty arguing its solvency for this purpose because it
had to argue substantially the opposite on the issue of bad faith.
105. By the time of the settlement, only a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court re-
mained pending. See Thomas Petzinger Jr., Texaco Loses Appeal on Huge Judgment as Texas
Supreme Court Refuses to Review Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1987, at A3 (“The Texas Supreme
Court affirmed Pennzoil Co.’s $10.3 billion judgment against Texaco Inc., leaving Texaco one
last forum—the U.S. Supreme Court—to reverse the devastating claim.”).
106. See supra note 86 (discussing the liquidation value of Texaco).
107. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998).
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strategies.108 But these models allow for only a single actor facing a
choice among alternatives. Because the models lack interactivity—
strategist against strategist—the strategies employed are simple and
usually of limited interest in and of themselves.
To accommodate interactivity, law-and-economics scholars turn
to a second methodology: game theory. Game theory posits the exis-
tence of two or more rational maximizers who compete with one an-
other for desired outcomes.109 The theorist “solves” the game by de-
termining the optimal moves for each player and proving those moves
to be optimal.110 Economically-inclined scholars have used game the-
ory extensively in  studying the incentives that particular rule patterns
create and the strategies that will best exploit them.111 As Rasmussen
states:
Modern game theory has advanced law-and-economic analysis past
the Coasian notion that parties, if they are well informed and trans-
action costs are low enough, will always reach the correct result.
Any proposal for the creation of a default rule now has to be con-
cerned with strategic obstacles that will impede a party from making
the optimal choice.112
Game theory is effective in analyzing interactions involving two,
or at most three, types of players in games where players can choose
between only two, or at most three, alternatives.113 To analyze more
108. See, e.g., Basu, supra note 21, at 13 (“The standard view of law in economics and re-
lated social sciences is of something that changes the set of strategies open to an individual or
the ‘payoff function’ of the individual.”); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Busi-
ness Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1834-35 (1998) (referring to opportunistic behavior of a
party in an economic model as “strategic”).
109. See generally ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY (1989) (describing game theory).
110. See id. at 26-27.
111. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW passim (1994)
(outlining the various applications of game theory in the law).
112. Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,
71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 111 (1992) (footnote omitted). For examples of articles considering the stra-
tegic implications of rules, see Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency
and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) (showing how transaction
costs affect the choice of default rules); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Eco-
nomic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (analyzing strategic incen-
tives in bargaining); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of
the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 279 (1998) (discussing the problems of pri-
vate information).
113. Multiple-player games are possible. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-
Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 583 (1995) (describing a five-player
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complex interactions, a few economically-minded scholars turn to a
third methodology: gaming.114 That is, rather than attempt to discover
a comprehensive solution to the game, the researcher conducts plays
of the game and evaluates the strategies employed by the players.
Thus, for example, even though game theorists cannot prove “tit for
tat” to be an optimal solution to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game,
the strategy has defeated all others in empirical trials.115
Though gaming holds considerable promise for doing so,116 eco-
nomic models have not yet managed to replicate the rich strategic in-
teraction observable in legal practice. Almost invariably, economic
models define in advance, with as little ambiguity as possible, both the
goals of the strategists and the rules for interaction. That is, they
adopt what we have referred to as the strictly formalist version of the
conventional view.117 Usually, the economist’s purpose is not to un-
derstand the process of strategizing, but to determine the pattern of
outcomes that the strategic interaction will generate. Though sur-
prises can occur within the restricted confines of these models, they
are uncommon.
By contrast, lawyers conceive and execute their strategies in an
environment in which the rules118 for interaction are unclear and con-
stantly in flux. The challenge to the lawyers in Texaco was not to de-
termine how best to respond to a rule pattern in certain conditions. It
was to determine how best to respond in a context in which the rules
were highly ambiguous and the conditions not entirely knowable. In
practice, the strategist often succeeds by transcending what previously
appeared to be the rules of the interaction. The emphasis is on crea-
game in the bankruptcy context). This is practical only if all additional players are identical to
one of the two or three types.
114. See generally CATHY STEIN GREENBLAT, DESIGNING GAMES AND SIMULATIONS
(1988); SIMULATION AND GAMING (journal devoted to the subject).
115. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 520-22 (1994) (describing
both theoretical and empirical research).
116. Gaming does not necessarily require complete specification of the model in advance.
The model can permit human decisionmakers to do anything their human counterparts could,
though the recordkeeping for such a game can be burdensome. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI,
PLAYER’S MANUAL FOR THE DEBTOR CREDITOR GAME 5 (1985) (using human decisionmak-
ers as judges).
117. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
118. “Rules” as we use the word here is a reference not to rules of law but to the rules ulti-
mately governing the interaction.
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tivity, imagination, and flexibility. Surprises are routine.119 In addition,
the environment in which the lawyers work is more complex than the
environments of game theory and gaming because client goals are
multifaceted, imperfectly known, and subject to change, in contrast to
economic models in which the single goal is to maximize utility.120
Consequently, economic models fail to capture the crucial strategic
element of legal practice.
II.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL STRATEGY
A strategy is a plan for action intended to accomplish some
goal.121 It presumes some “field of play”—people, data, or things that
can be rearranged. The chess strategist arranges pieces by sequences
of moves. The war strategist arranges troops, weapons, and propa-
ganda. In either arena, the first task of the strategist is to understand
the people, data, and things the strategist can manipulate directly.
The legal strategist works with decisionmakers, facts, legal cul-
tures and law. The decisionmakers are judges, juries, arbitrators, ad-
ministrators, boards, commissions, lawyers, and parties. The facts are
events, both past and future. Those events morph into statements of
fact, evidence, testimony, records, and finally the “facts” stated in
court opinions. Legal cultures are sets of practices, perceptions, and
expectations that differ from group to group and are often outcome-
determinative.122 The “law” is perhaps the most difficult of the four
elements to conceptualize for the purpose of a theory of legal strat-
egy. Misunderstanding the nature of law has probably been the prin-
cipal impediment to the integration of strategy into legal theory. If
law were what some conventional theorists conceive it to be—a set of
written rules that specify comprehensively the appropriate outcomes
119. Cf., e.g., 2 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 7, at 1046-47 (1992) (noting the role
of creativity in legal strategy).
120. As Professor Nussbaum stated:
A commitment to the commensurability of all an agent’s ends runs very deep in the
Law and Economics movement. Even when a plurality of distinct ends is initially rec-
ognized, the underlying view that agents are “maximizers of satisfactions,” and that
satisfaction is something that varies in degree rather than in kind, leads the theorist
rapidly back to the idea that distinctions among options should be understood in
terms of the quantity of utility they afford, rather than in terms of any basic qualita-
tive differences.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of)
Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1997).
121. See supra note 7 (defining “strategy”).
122. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the rise and fall of local legal cultures).
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
2000] A THEORY OF LEGAL STRATEGY 1429
for various fact patterns—legal strategy could have far less impact on
outcomes.
A. Definitions of Law
By what is probably the most common definition, “law” is a set
of rules and standards promulgated by the state to govern conduct. In
the American legal system, these rules and standards appear in stat-
utes, court rules, court opinions, regulations, ordinances, and the like.
The definition excludes social norms (the rules that spontaneously
arise in groups of all sizes),123 oral legal traditions, and private con-
tracts,124 even though the sanctions for violation of any of the three
may be severe. This definition includes the “law on the books”
whether or not it is in fact honored in the operation of the legal sys-
tem. In the remainder of this Article, we will refer to the law thus de-
scribed as “written law” or as “legal doctrine.”125
Two leading Realists, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Karl N.
Llewellyn, used the word “law” to refer to what courts or other par-
ticipants in the legal system will do in fact. As Holmes put it:
Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will
find some text writers telling you that it is something different from
what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is
a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or
admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with
the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we
shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deduc-
123. The term “social norm,” as we use it here, includes the “sense of appropriateness de-
veloped in the [legal] profession and the public over time [but not expressed in legal rules]” that
Dworkin refers to as “legal principles.” RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 40
(1977).
124. Broader definitions often include one or more of these. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 2 (1999) (“The law of the state may be important, but
law, real law, is found in all human relations, from the simplest, briefest encounter between two
people to the most inclusive and permanent type of interaction.”); Walter Otto Weyrauch &
Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the “Gypsies”, 103 YALE L.J. 323,
326-29 (1993) (including oral legal traditions within the meaning of “law”); Weyrauch, Unwrit-
ten Law, supra note 39, at 1236 (suggesting that overreliance on written law “by Texaco’s law-
yers contributed to, if not caused, the loss of the case” in Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729
S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987)).
125. Some writers include written law within the category of social norms. See, e.g., William
K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 546 (“For the present, I encom-
pass all rules and standards, without regard to their origins or means of enforcement [within the
definition of social norm]. The legal system provides important norms and usually stipulates
sanctions for deviant behavior.”).
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tions, but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or
English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law.126
Llewellyn expanded Holmes’s definition to include the actions of
officials, including lawyers.127 This conception of law ignores “rules of
law” that are not enforced and ascribes to those that are enforced the
same meaning given them by the officials. So, for example, if the rules
of court provide that “if a party fails to respond to a request for ad-
mission within thirty days, the matter is deemed admitted,” but the
judges routinely extend the thirty-day period after it has expired, un-
der the conception of law discussed here, failure to respond timely to
a request for admission operates as an admission only if the court fails
to excuse it. Using Pound’s terminology, we will refer to this concep-
tion of law as the “law in action.”128
Law, social norms, and physical constraints are, as means of so-
cial control, largely interchangeable.129 Hence, we would add to
Holmes’s and Llewellyn’s definitions of law the effects of social
norms and physical constraints to the extent they contribute to legal
outcomes. The resulting conception of law, which we refer to as “de-
livered law,”130 attempts to link fact patterns with outcomes in a man-
ner that is sensitive to “how much the [legal] system will cost, how
long the system will take, what the system will require of the client
along the way, and what the system will deliver in the end.”131 Deliv-
ered law is the pattern of outcomes the legal system delivers. To con-
tinue with the preceding example, if judges routinely extend the
thirty-day period for responding to requests for admission, then the
126. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897).
127. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 3:
This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the business of
law. And the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs
or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these officials do about
disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.
128. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 19 (1910) (de-
scribing the latter as “adjusting the letter of the law to the demands of administration in con-
crete cases”).
129. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 488-91
(1997) (describing the use of law, social norms, and physical constraints in the construction of
law-related systems).
130. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1551-55 (explaining the term “delivered law”).
131. Id. at 1551.
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delivered law is that responses to requests for admission are required
only at such time as the court may fix.
As one of us has argued elsewhere, the lawyers, judges, and other
officials who regularly interact in the processing of cases in a legal
community forge and share mental models of the law that are both
different from and simpler than the written law.132 They process rou-
tine cases according to the model, referencing the written law only
when the model is challenged. For example, the law on the books
provides complex, subjective tests for determining whether loans
from insiders must be subordinated under a Chapter 11 plan. In the
district in which one of us practiced, the delivered law was that debts
owing to insiders could not be subordinated. At the same time, the
delivered law of another district was that debt owing to insiders had
to be subordinated. The lawyers and judges who processed cases in
each district probably shared a mental model of the law that validated
the law delivered in their district.133 That model was nowhere reduced
to writing. We will refer to the law contained in these mental models
as “the law in lawyers’ heads.”134
Finally, oral legal traditions that parallel but do not coincide with
the other forms of law arise spontaneously in social groups.135 These
traditions, which deal with virtually every subject touched by state-
made law and many subjects that are not, are in large part the same
phenomena discussed by sociologists as “social norms,”136 and some-
times discussed by economists as “spontaneous” or “private” order-
ing.137 Weyrauch and Bell138 and others,139 most notably Robert Ellick-
132. See id. at 1516-20; see also Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 688 n.24 (1985) (arguing that “easy cases” do not
exist in written law, but seem to exist “because the lawyers are socialized into and are part of a
way of life that defines the cases as easy”).
133. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1504-05 (presenting this example in more detail).
134. See id. at 1500.
135. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 124, at 326-33. See generally Weyrauch, supra note 39
(describing the unwritten rules governing three isolated social units).
136. See, e.g., Tracey L. Mears & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 805, 809-16 (1998) (presenting a taxonomy of the concept of “norms”
in the social sciences).
137. See generally Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (collecting numerous works on social norms and economic
analysis).
138. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 124, at 331 n.16 (postulating hypotheses about the
relationship between informal private law and traditional state law).
139. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 161 (1998) (noting with regard to the opinion publication practices of the federal
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son,140 have noted the ability of these informal rules to displace state-
made law.
Some oral legal traditions, however, do not fit easily within the
category of “social norms” because they appear, not in the form of
rules that purport to govern behavior, but in the form of shared ex-
pectations about the outcomes which are appropriate under a given
set of facts. For example, a particular community might expect that a
youthful first offender should not do jail time for possession of a small
amount of marijuana. We refer to the latter kinds of oral legal tradi-
tions as “expectations regarding outcome.”
B. The Relationship Between Written Law, Social Norms, and
Expectations Regarding Outcomes
Conventional legal theory regards the written law as specifying a
set of rules that govern both social interaction and dispute resolu-
tion.141 For nearly any set of facts, the theory posits, written law speci-
fies the appropriate outcome.142 The theorists who subscribe to this
view acknowledge the existence of “gray areas” in which the appro-
priate outcomes are unclear. They differ regarding the size of these
gray areas, but nearly all agree that written law specifies appropriate
outcomes for a wide range of “easy” cases.143 In their view, social
norms, prejudices, public policies, and social expectations are relevant
only in the small minority of cases of first impression or cases in which
litigants seek a change in the law to reflect modern conditions.144
courts of appeals that “the behavior of judges is primarily governed by internally generated
norms that can be altogether different from the officially stated organizational rules”).
140. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (arguing that social norms
are capable of displacing law).
141. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 3, at 407 (explaining that “the Constitution channels and
constitutes American public and private life”).
142. But see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“General
propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise.”).
143. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 3, at 414 (using as his example of an easy case an attempt
by a person under 35 years of age to assume the Presidency of the United States). But see An-
thony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The “Easy Case” of the Under-aged President, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 250, 250-52 (1990) (disputing Schauer’s example and emphasizing the impor-
tance of the context in which the case arises).
144. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973) (changing the law in Florida
from contributory negligence to comparative negligence because “contemporary conditions
must be met with contemporary standards”).
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The theory we present here regards delivered law as the product
of complex interactions among written laws, law in lawyers’ heads,
social norms, law in action, system imperatives, and expectations re-
garding outcomes. Legal strategists, who include lawyers, clients,
judges, legislators, other officials, and sometimes persons who have
not yet retained a lawyer or even become involved in a dispute, are
the catalysts for these interactions. Through these strategic interac-
tions, they construct the pattern of legal outcomes. Within broad cul-
tural limits, the strategies these participants pursue and the quality
with which they execute them—not law or judges—determine that
pattern.145
Social norms and expectations regarding outcomes specify “just”
or “fair” outcomes for virtually all human interaction, including inter-
actions directly addressed by written law or the law in lawyers’
heads.146 In regard to those interactions, the norms or expectations are
often congruent with the written law and/or the law in lawyers’ heads,
but often they are not. One can easily think of examples of situations
in which the written law requires one pattern of conduct, but social
norms permit or require another. The possession and sale of illegal
drugs is perfectly acceptable in particular subcultures. A testator has
the legal right to disinherit a child, but any attempt to exercise that
right clashes with a social norm that allows disinheritance only in the
most extreme circumstances.147 The written law may applaud and pro-
tect the whistleblower at the same time that social norms render him
or her unemployable.148
145. As Lawrence Friedman has put it, “what makes a theory or a strategy ‘persuasive’ or
winning is culturally and historically determined.” Letter from Lawrence M. Friedman, Marion
Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to Walter O. Weyrauch, Steven C.
O’Connell Chair and Distinguished Professor, University of Florida College of Law (Aug. 5,
1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
146. See ELLICKSON, supra note 140, at 69-81 (describing a system of norms that addresses
the same subject as section 841 of the California Civil Code—determining who pays the costs of
boundary fences).
147. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 551 (5th ed. 1995) (“In contests
by disinherited children, judges and juries are frequently influenced by their sympathies for the
children. This is well known to practicing lawyers, who will often advise the devisees to agree to
an out-of-court settlement with a disinherited child.”).
148. See David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial
Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 112 (1995) (noting that most whistleblowers “have been
fired, blackballed from their industry or profession, and have suffered personal problems”);
Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 295 (1995) (describing the present regime
with regard to lawyers as “a mandatory nonwhistleblowing regime”).
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These norms specify—though with considerable imprecision—
the socio-legal entitlements of members of the group. Though the writ-
ten law may seem to entitle the bank to call the loan “on demand,”149
the social norm may require that the bank act with some considera-
tion for the borrower.150 Though the written law may regard the em-
ployer as entitled to discharge the employee “at will,” the social norm
may prohibit discharge for certain “unjust” reasons.151 Strategists who
acquire the property of others in “perfectly legal” transactions may
nevertheless be regarded as thieves.152
Conventional legal theory assumes wrongly that decisionmakers
will apply written law to the exclusion of social norms,153 maintains
falsely that expectations regarding outcomes are the direct product of
written law,154 and does not even recognize the existence of the law in
lawyers’ heads.155 Were these assumptions accurate, legal strategists
would have relatively few tools to employ. In fact, written law is suffi-
ciently malleable that decisionmakers can interpret it to support vir-
tually any position that finds support in social norms or expectations
regarding outcomes.156 That is, whatever exists in a fact pattern that
149. U.C.C. § 1-208 cmt. (1997) (providing that the U.C.C. good faith requirement “has no
application to demand instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time
with or without reason”).
150. See KMC v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying U.C.C. § 1-208
to require good faith in calling a demand note); JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 32-
35 (1939) (describing Oklahoma Depression-era farm repossessions as little different from theft
of property).
151. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Em-
ployment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1929 (1996) (arguing that a clear norm forbids
firing an employee without cause, despite the employee’s formal at-will status).
152. See, e.g., Joseph B. Cahill, Title-Loan Firms Offer Car Owners a Solution That Often
Backfires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at A1 (referring to auto-title lending as “legalized extor-
tion”).
153. Professor Robert Burns describes the conventional view as follows:
The Received View understands the trial as a necessary institutional device for actu-
alizing the Rule of Law in situations where there are disputes of fact. The trial allows
punishments to be imposed or civil wrongs to be righted only after a careful factual
analysis of what actually occurred, specifically structured for the exclusive application
of an established legal rule to the exclusion of other possible norms.
Robert P. Burns, Some Realism (and Idealism) About the Trial, 31 GA. L. REV. 715, 717 (1997).
154. For example, when asked how the courts would rule on a particular case, most law stu-
dents and many lawyers would merely consult the written law. By so doing, they would implic-
itly assume that the written law determines outcomes.
155. See generally LoPucki, supra note 30 (arguing that legal culture determines mental
models of law in lawyers’ heads which leads to differing laws in different communities).
156. The matter has been the subject of extensive debate. See D’Amato, supra note 143, at
251-56 (collecting sources). Our argument does not depend, however, on the outcome of that
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gives rise to rights or entitlements under social norms will find sup-
port in legal doctrine.157 As the language of written law departs from
the entitlements of parties under social norms, that language becomes
less effective.158
The view that written law drives legal outcomes is plausible only
because written law (to the extent that it has any meaning at all) is
usually in accord with social norms. The outcomes of cases in which
the applicable norms differ from the written law demonstrate that the
norms, not the written law, are the driving force.159 While written law
is sufficiently flexible to support virtually any social norm, the social
norms of a particular group are not sufficiently flexible to support vir-
tually any written law.160
debate. Our statement in the text is what we consider to be the best explanation of the legal
strategy phenomenon.
157. The empirical test of this proposition is whether one can find a real case or invent a re-
alistic hypothetical in which no legal doctrine exists by which a court could reach the outcome
that accords with the applicable social norms. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. Profes-
sor D’Amato makes this point another way, arguing that some cases appear easy to decide in
accord with the written law only because no dispute exists. With respect to Lawrence Solum’s
candidate for the irrefutable easy case—if a homeowner eats ice cream in the privacy of her
home, it will not give rise to any legal action—D’Amato responds:
But there is no dispute here! No one is claiming that the homeowner has injured any-
one else by eating ice cream, and hence there is no occasion to cite a legal rule that
she may have violated. There is, in short, no “case.” Professor Solum must supply us
with a posited but real harm to someone resulting from the homeowner’s action in
order to have a person who could make a claim against her.
D’Amato, supra note 143, at 256. By a “dispute,” D’Amato obviously means the social basis for
a dispute, and by an “injury” he must intend one socially recognized as a wrong. The “social” in
this characterization is a reference to social norms. Thus, D’Amato’s response to Solum’s exam-
ple is that no legal doctrine supporting a contrary result should be expected, because no social
norm supports the contrary result.
158. See Farber, supra note 28, at 604 (“Of course, the more counterintuitive the outcome—
the more it violates what seems to be the purpose of the rule or runs against social norms—the
harder the task [manipulation of written law] becomes and the more valuable are the [manipula-
tion] skills involved.”).
159. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE-LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 82-83 (Michael Ansaldi
trans., 1989) (“Legal rules provide certainty in the affairs of people whose interests are affected
by law if, in a lawsuit, they yield a result that accords with their real-life norms.”). Professor
Basu has reached essentially the same conclusion through economic analysis. See Basu, supra
note 21, at 15-17 (arguing that law cannot reach outcomes unsupported by norms).
160. The difference is ultimately a product of the different forms in which the two kinds of
rules exist. Because law is written and the procedures for changing it are cumbersome, those
who administer it have introduced conflicting meta-rules that render it malleable with respect to
any given case. An example of conflicting meta-rules are the rules of stare decisis and obiter
dicta. The first holds that a court is bound to follow precedent. The second holds that statements
made in a decision that were not necessary to the decision are of no effect. A court that wishes
to narrow a rule to exclude the case before it has merely to distinguish the precedent in some
respect and then invoke the rule of obiter dicta to prevent the precedent from governing. The
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Social norms differ from group to group and place to place. The
geographical boundaries within which particular norms prevail are
not congruent with the jurisdictional boundaries of the written law.
Because the strategist can draw from such a wide variety of conflict-
ing social norms and written legal doctrines, the strategic possibilities
are virtually limitless.161 The strategist need only ascertain what in a
given fact pattern gives rise to the client’s conviction that the position
is just. By generalizing on that quality of the case, the strategist can
identify the governing social norm, which is probably already ex-
pressed in some existing legal doctrine. If it is not, the norm itself will
be sufficient to establish the doctrine.
This does not mean, of course, that the social norm identified will
appeal to anyone assigned to adjudicate the case. If the decision-
maker is from outside the group that forged the norm, the decision-
maker may not share it. But it does mean that if the decisionmaker
shares the norm—that is, believes after presentation of the case that
the party should win—then the doctrinal basis exists for a decision in
the party’s favor. Cases in which the decisionmaker sincerely162 opines
that a particular party should have won, but the law required a con-
trary result, are virtually always cases in which the party’s lawyer
failed to pursue the most persuasive legal theory.163
court that wishes to apply the rule to the case before it simply recites that whatever differences
exist between the two cases are unimportant. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 74-75 (discussing
the ability of courts to employ this technique to expand or narrow precedents). There are many
other examples of conflicting meta-rules. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (setting forth opposing canons of statutory construction).
161. See infra Part IV.C.
162. In some cases, the judge will not be sincere. He or she will use the supposedly binding
force of the law as an excuse for doing what he or she is inclined to do anyway.
163. To clarify the point, we pose the following challenge: it is impossible to identify any
case in which social norms favor a particular result that cannot be achieved because legal doc-
trine disfavors it. To put it another way, if the lawyer truly believes it would be just for the client
to win, the lawyer’s advice that the case will be difficult or impossible because the law favors the
other side is erroneous. We invite readers to attempt to identify such a case.
To illustrate our challenge, consider Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp.
49 (D. Mass. 1997), in which the court denied a claim brought on behalf of a man who died as a
result of his health insurer’s refusal to comply with its contractual obligations. ERISA provides
health insurers with an exemption from liability for actions taken in the administration of plans.
In Andrews-Clarke, the judge portrayed himself as sympathetic to the plaintiff’s case but bound
to an unjust result by the ERISA exemption. In a thinly-veiled plea to Congress to change the
law, the opinion ends with the words, “Does anyone care? Do you?” Id. at 65.
The case does not meet our challenge, however, for two reasons. First, the ERISA ex-
emption is not supported merely by law. It has been actively debated nationally, and something
of a consensus has formed among participants in the legal process that plaintiffs such as these
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High-stakes litigation is fought principally on two issues. The first
issue is who will decide the case.164 The second is who should win ac-
cording to the values of, or the norms adhered to by, the decision-
maker. Parties can use legal doctrine to persuade decisionmakers that
they should win, but legal doctrine  is only one tool  for doing  so. It is
seldom an effective one, because it inevitably carries within it support
for the opposing position.165
The task of persuading the decisionmaker at the normative level
is often an urgent one. Decisionmakers, particularly those who con-
ceptualize law as a generally consistent set of rules that inform and
bind their decisions, may frame the issue in accord with the first per-
suasive argument and be unable to give fair consideration to equally
persuasive but conflicting arguments.166 Once the decisionmaker is
persuaded at the normative level, the task of persuasion at the doc-
trinal level is easier and less urgent. The strategist need only provide
the decisionmaker with legal doctrine that plausibly links the facts of
the case to the strategist’s desired conclusion. That other legal doc-
trines plausibly link the facts to other conclusions presents no real
danger at this late stage. Presented with a bridge to the “right” con-
clusion, the decisionmaker is unlikely to adopt a doctrinal rationale
that leads to a conclusion he or she believes is wrong.
The possibility of an appeal may seem, at first, a significant bar-
rier to the trial judge’s imposition of personal values in determination
of the case. However, with the exception of appeals by certain “domi-
should be sacrificed to the national drive to control health care costs. That consensus is itself a
norm. Second, while the court could not have freed the plaintiff of the burden of ERISA ex-
emption, the court could have awarded relief on some other basis. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65
F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an action was not preempted by ERISA because a
health care plan was vicariously liable for medical malpractice of a physician under a state law
theory); Moreno v. Health Partners Health Plan, 4 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding
that ERISA does not preempt a health care plan provider’s liability for its negligence in de-
signing a substandard health care plan or the negligence of the plan’s physicians in treating pa-
tients); see also Peter Aronson, Congress Squares Off Over HMO Liability, NAT’L L.J., June 21,
1999, at A1 (discussing pending cases in which strategists seek to overcome ERISA preemp-
tion).
164. See infra Part III.C.5.
165. See supra note 160.
166. See FRANK E. COOPER, LIVING THE LAW 161 (1958) (suggesting that “the initial im-
pression counts more than all the rest of the argument”). But see William C. Costopoulos, Per-
suasion in the Courtroom, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 384, 392-95 (1972) (contending that the advantage
will differ from case to case).
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nant parties,”167 the losing party’s right to appeal an adverse decision
is likely to have little actual impact on case outcome. First, the judges’
determinations of fact are for all practical purposes unappealable.168 A
judge who wishes to avoid reversal on appeal can often do so simply
by making a disingenuous ruling against the appellant on an issue of
fact instead of on the issue of law that is actually in controversy. Sec-
ond, practical considerations such as costs, delay, or an inadequate re-
cord prevent appeals of the large majority of judicial decisions.169
Third, many, if not most, appeals are disposed of without argument or
actual consideration by the judges of the appellate court,170 making
167. Farole, supra note 18 (finding that state governments are more successful on appeals in
state supreme courts but that businesses are not more successful than individuals); see also Don-
ald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (1992) (finding that data shows the
“stronger” parties are more successful in U.S. courts of appeals).
168. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (“[I]f the dis-
trict court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the
court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of
fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”).
169. Even though the court may make numerous contested rulings in the course of a single
case, the number of appeals from U.S. district courts is only about one-fifth the number of cases
filed in the district courts. The corresponding percentage for the bankruptcy courts is four-
tenths of one percent. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1530 n.159.
170. Though the rules may require a judge to make findings of fact in cases tried without
juries, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52 (stating that “in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclu-
sions of law thereon”), they are not required to explain what they believe to be the governing
law or its appropriate application to the facts. In the large majority of their cases, American
judges write neither opinions nor explanatory orders. The U.S. Supreme Court receives nearly
7,000 appeals and petitions for certiorari each year. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—
Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372 (1998) (showing 1,990 fee-paid appeals and petitions for
review and 4,581 in forma pauperis appeals and petitions for review in 1997). Yet the Court is-
sues fewer than 100 opinions. See, e.g., id. at 370 (showing 93 full opinions issued in 1997). The
number of cases filed in the U.S. district courts is about 38 times the number of opinions written,
even though an opinion may deal with only a single issue in a case. For example, over the 12-
month period ending September 30, 1996, there were 269 filings in U.S. district courts, see
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
51 (1996); a search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, Newer File (Feb. 27, 2000) for records containing
“F. Supp.” or “F. Supp” in the CITE field and “1996” in DATE field yielded only 7,819 records.
The proportion of cases in which judges offer no explanation of their decisions is apparently
rising. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation
in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 267, 267-301 (1976) (finding that the
proportion of cases in which judges wrote opinions or made findings in two California counties
declined steadily and significantly from 1890 to 1970); William Glaberson, Caseload Forcing
Two-Level System for U.S. Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, at A1 (“[C]ourt statistics show
that Federal appeals courts publish only 24 percent of their decisions, down sharply form 54
percent in 1985.”).
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
2000] A THEORY OF LEGAL STRATEGY 1439
them little more than empty rituals.171 Finally, even if the decision is
reversed on appeal, the case may be remanded to the judge who ini-
tially decided it “incorrectly.” That judge may reach the same deci-
sion on remand, merely substituting a rationale acceptable to the ap-
pellate court or deciding the case on a different issue. Of course, if the
appellate court does undertake to decide the merits of the case, its
decision will not be the product of legal doctrine, but the product of
the same factors discussed here, viewed from the appellate judges’
own perspectives and based on the record presented to them.172
The basic strategy outlined here—persuade the decisionmaker
and provide a doctrinal bridge to the desired result—is capable of
producing virtually any result consistent with the decisionmaker’s
values. This does not mean, however, that the system is capable of
doing so in every case. The kind of lawyering required for such strat-
egy is skilled, time-consuming, and therefore expensive. For lawyers
to do it too frequently may violate the local legal community’s norms
for case processing.173 In low-stakes cases, considerations of cost and
171. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274-75 (1996)
(describing changes in the operation of the federal courts of appeals and concluding that “an
effective right to appeal error to the circuit courts no longer exists; instead, litigants must peti-
tion the staff to obtain access to the judges”); Glaberson, supra note 170, at 1 (noting that “the
[federal courts of appeals] created new staff lawyer positions, permanent employees with the
authority to screen and, some critics say, to effectively decide thousands of cases by giving
judges brief summaries of recommended decisions”). Empirical research demonstrates that
some of the courts of appeals dispose of the hardest cases without opinions in order to reduce
their workload. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 139, at 192-93. Some of these practices of
the courts of appeals were challenged in United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 170 F.3d 187 (11th Cir.
1999). That case received substantial attention from the media for the important issues it raised
about court practices. See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 170 (“The debate in the case shows how
the dispute over the abbreviated appeals proceedings is playing out across the country.”); Wil-
liam C. Smith, Big Objections to Brief Decision: Critics Contend One-Word Appellate Rulings
Give Short Shrift to Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 34 (discussing criticism of “no-comment de-
cisions by circuit courts”). In what can only be regarded as an incredible display of arrogance,
the district court ruled against the plaintiff without writing an opinion; the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed in a one-word opinion, 170 F.3d at 187; and the Supreme Court denied certiorari without
stating any reasons, 120 S. Ct. at 445.
172. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: De-
fendants’ Advantage 4 (May 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal) (empirical study showing that in cases tried by juries, defendants win reversal in 31% of
appeals while plaintiffs win reversal in only 13% of appeals). Because appellate judges have a
narrower legal right to overturn a jury verdict than do trial judges, these results are virtually un-
explainable by any conventional theory.
173. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1529-32 (describing pressures on lawyers to move mat-
ters along).
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case-processing resources are likely to dominate, producing outcomes
in accord with the law in lawyers’ heads.174
C. The Residual Role of Legal Doctrine
Written law is less influential in the legal system we have de-
scribed than it is in common understanding. Though the large major-
ity of decisions will appear to be in accord with law, they are in no
meaningful sense the product of it.175 Legal strategy, playing on expec-
tations regarding outcomes and social norms internalized by the deci-
sionmaker, determines case outcomes.176 The rules of the written law
are mere incantations177 that may or may not have some effect on the
decisionmaker. Unsupported by norms, the rules become impotent
technicalities, “scrivener’s errors,” or dead letters.178
Though our theory may at first seem to exclude written law from
legal system content, it does not do so entirely. First, unskilled parties
or their lawyers can render indeterminate law determinate through
admissions that characterize the facts in such a way that particular ad-
verse doctrine applies or through concessions that adverse doctrine
applies. The legal process deliberately pressures lawyers and parties
to make such admissions.179 Theoretically, one can deny every allega-
tion and object to every piece of evidence. But in practice, a pattern
of such denials and objections quickly discredits both parties’ wit-
174. See id. at 1516-20.
175. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The
Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 126 (1998) (referring to “the much-criticized
American tradition of judicial subterfuge, in which courts claim to follow statutory rules and
testators’ intent rigidly but in fact manipulate equitable doctrines to effect estate distributions
that comport with judges’ individual standards of fairness and justice”).
176. See Basu, supra note 21, at 22 (concluding that “[i]f a certain outcome is not an equilib-
rium of the economy, then it cannot be implemented through any law”).
177. See Walter O. Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic in Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 782, 798-800
(1973) (analogizing “magic and magicians to law and lawyers”).
178. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the doctrine of “scrivener’s error” gives the Court the authority to “correct” a stat-
ute that does not have a “plausible purpose”). Absent legislative history describing its purpose,
any statute that is contrary to established social norms will appear to be without plausible pur-
pose and hence an appropriate candidate for correction.
179. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1996) (de-
scribing district court pressures on parties to communicate their factual and legal theories); J.F.
Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1326-27 (7th Cir.
1976) (appending a standing order on pretrial conferences ordering parties to stipulate to the
“uncontested facts” and to recite their own versions of the contested facts).
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nesses and their lawyers.180 The lawyers may be marginalized and ul-
timately ostracized.181 Lawyers must appear to be constructively en-
gaged in a process that “narrows the issues” in preparation for the
court’s decision.182 Often, they come under intense pressure to admit
facts or the applicability of law before they can entirely predict the ef-
fect of their admissions.183 Once a party has, against its own interests,
admitted each of the facts in the antecedent of a rule184 in the lan-
guage of that rule, the court may no longer have any alternative but
to apply the rule. In such a case, legal doctrine may compel a particu-
lar outcome.
Second, participants in the legal process may see the rules of
written law themselves as norms. That is, they may believe that a
party should win because the rules of written law seem to direct that
the party should win.185 This belief is an erroneous one; written law
generally obtains normative content only when decisionmakers inject
that content through interpretation in the particular case.186 Some de-
cisionmakers’ lack of sophistication in this regard, perhaps combined
with poor lawyering on the losing sides, prevents those decisionmak-
ers from seeing this. When decisionmakers feel genuinely compelled
to a particular result because they believe it to be required by the
rule, the result does, in a sense, follow from the rule.
That does not mean that the strategist should devote much effort
to determining what result the rules compel on particular facts. The
rules compel no particular result. Instead, the realization that deci-
sionmakers may perceive themselves as compelled to accept a par-
180. For example, in Pennzoil v. Texaco, Texaco’s executives were each able to deny credi-
bly remembering reading the Wall Street Journal report that Pennzoil had reached an agreement
with Getty; however, Pennzoil’s lawyers were able to discredit them as a group by noting the
cumulative effect: “Thus, January 5, 1984, became known at the trial as the one day in Texaco’s
history during which no one read the Wall Street Journal.” PETZINGER, supra note 34, at 313.
181. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1531 (indicating that lawyers who engage in such be-
havior may become “ineffective in that community”).
182. See cases cited supra note 179; COOPER, supra note 166, at 43-50 (addressing the impor-
tance of an attorney’s formulation of the issues to the final decision).
183. Thus, the ability to foresee the effects of admission may be the most valuable aspect of
legal experience.
184. The “antecedent” of a rule is the “if” clause once the rule has been translated into an if-
then statement. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
185. See Basu, supra note 21, at 18 (observing that “the law works . . . entirely through its
influence on people’s beliefs and opinion[s]”).
186. For example, Llewellyn states that “[i]f a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the
light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective,
is nonsense.” Llewellyn, supra note 160, at 400.
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ticular rule recommends that the strategists attempt to discover how
the process settles on a particular rule. The issue is explored further in
Part III.
Third, even judges who believe, as we do, that law exists to sup-
port any conclusion they may choose to reach in the vast majority of
cases will continue to be concerned with the doctrinal bridges by
which they explain their decisions. Some outcomes will be more
popular than others among the court’s constituents. Particularly when
the outcome will be unpopular within an important segment of that
constituency, the ability of the judge to wrap the decision convinc-
ingly in legal doctrine can be important.187 The judge’s willingness to
make a particular decision may depend in part on the level of assis-
tance counsel’s briefs and arguments offer in the drafting of a persua-
sive opinion.188
Perhaps the most important role of legal doctrine today is in
maintaining the respect of the public for the legal system and the de-
cisions it renders. The public tolerates the current system because it
erroneously believes that the system operates largely according to the
conventional view.189 That is, that by and large, written laws bind
judges to particular outcomes.
187. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) (describing the doctrinal and political con-
straints on judges phenomenologically).
188. Lawyers sometimes actually draft the judge’s order or opinion, but the practice is gen-
erally frowned upon. See, e.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 n.46 (11th
Cir. 1997) (admonishing that “[w]e have consistently frowned upon the practice of delegating
the task of drafting important opinions to litigants, and ‘the cases admonishing trial courts for
the verbatim adoption of proposed orders drafted by litigants are legion’” (quoting Colony
Square Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 272, 274-75 (11th Cir. 1987))).
189. Probably the best evidence of this belief are the repeated warnings that various actions
will undermine that conventional view. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142
(3d Cir. 1991) (confirming that “confidence of the public in the rule of law would be under-
mined”); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 651, 689 (1995)
(stating that use of a prediction model “would undermine the public’s confidence in, and its felt
obligation to, the rule of law”); Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revo-
lutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34 (1995) (referring to the “rule of law to which the public is
probably more devoted than to any specific constitutional doctrine or ruling”); Neil K. Sethi,
The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional Speech Restriction for Judicial Selection,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 723-24 (1997) (declaring that “[l]itigants, especially those who do not
prevail, must believe that judicial decisions are made on the basis of neutral criteria and are
grounded on more than the judge’s personal feelings”); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a
Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983) (referring to “the risk of undermining public
confidence in the stability of our basic rules of law”); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable
Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 632 (1999) (claiming that
“attacks on judicial activism are often stated in terms that appeal to public understanding of the
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But judicial opinions are, in essence, merely propaganda on be-
half of the judiciary. Their purpose is to support the belief that legal
doctrine plays a role in the system that it, in fact, does not. The diffi-
culties of nations that lack a tradition of respect for written law—such
as Russia and China—underline the importance of the exercise.190
Those difficulties should not, however, be considered justification for
American legal scholars to maintain falsely that legal doctrine is the
principal  determinant of  legal outcomes when it is not. Among other
problems with that approach, steadily accumulating data on case out-
comes will soon prove it wrong.191
III.  THE VARIETIES OF LEGAL STRATEGY
This part describes the wide variety of legal strategies currently
in use. Participants in the legal system have acknowledged most of
these strategies individually but not their cumulative effect. We assert
that the presence or absence of these strategies, and perhaps numer-
ous others of which we are unaware, is the predominant determinant
of case outcomes.
We present our taxonomy in three parts. First, most (but not all)
legal strategies seek to enlist the judge. Other legal strategies seek to
pressure the judge or limit the judge’s alternatives, while still other
legal strategies seek to deprive the judge of any say at all in the out-
come of the case.
A. Strategies Requiring Willing Acceptance by Judges
Strategies that seek to persuade the judge, jury, or other deci-
sionmaker to rule in the strategist’s favor are both the most common
and the most visible type. Some of these strategies of persuasion may
have nothing to do with the particular case. For example, lawyers
adopt the speech, mannerism, and dress of jurors or judges as a means
of gaining their confidence.192 They attempt to undermine the credi-
importance of the rule of law that requires judges to base their decisions on the law”). The pub-
lic’s belief in the rule of law coexists with its inconsistent belief that skillful lawyers can ma-
nipulate the system to reach virtually any result. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Development
of Legal Culture: Russian Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
923 (1997) (describing the Russian Judicial Chamber’s efforts to create a legal culture).
191. See infra Part V.
192. See ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL: THEORIES, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES
55 (1991) (“Attorneys may have to put aside personal tastes and conform their dress to the
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bility of adverse witnesses, even when they believe them truthful.193
They employ rhetorical techniques, such as theme, repetition, and in-
nuendo.194 They pursue “linguistic strategies,” employing words and
phrases that seem concrete and evoke favorable reactions, while
skirting the edges of falsifiability.195 They may attempt to construct
logical arguments196 or they may simply throw out possibilities in the
hope that the decisionmaker will seize upon one of them.197
Most strategy, however, relates to case-specific information: the
evidence the lawyer will offer, the facts the lawyer will assert, or the
rationale the lawyer will encourage the decisionmaker to adopt. The
three combine to form an argument that the decisionmaker should
reach a particular conclusion.
Ostensibly, the system approves only a single rationale for deci-
sions:198 application of the written law to the facts proven requires the
standards of a community or judge so as to safeguard and promote the best interests of a cli-
ent.”).
193. See FRANK, supra note 17, at 82 (“The lawyer considers it his duty to create a false im-
pression, if he can, of any witness who gives [disadvantageous] testimony.”).
194. See, e.g., PETER L. MURRAY, BASIC TRIAL ADVOCACY 97-105 (1995) (advocating
story-telling in the opening statement); id. at 353-78 (describing the use of dramatics, body lan-
guage and rhetoric in the summation); Peter B. Carlisle, In Cold Blood and the Fine Art of the
Opening Statement, HAWAII B.J., Nov. 1999, at 9 (advocating theme and repetition in opening
statements); Ervin A. Gonzalez, Creating and Developing Winning Themes and Arguments,
FLA. B.J., Feb. 1988, at 53 (“[Y]our trial plan should be built around a theme that will define the
case and will allow the jury to rally around that theme.”).
195. DELANEY, supra note 82, at 167-68 (discussing “linguistic strategies” that can help “le-
gitimate the claim to bankruptcy”); id. at 161 (providing an example).
196. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING 1-2 (1989) (equating logical reasoning with thinking like a lawyer).
197. See, e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch, Legal Practice as Search for Truth, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
123, 128-29 (1985) (book review) (discussing Viehweg’s advocacy of argument “based on multi-
ple, perhaps overlapping or even contradictory, points” so that “failure of one point leaves the
others intact”). Logical arguments are relatively weak in the legal context because they proceed
in an orderly fashion from their premises to their conclusions. Successful attack on a single ele-
ment destroys the entire argument. Their order alerts decisionmakers and opponents to each
argument’s points of vulnerability. A generally more effective alternative is to make emotionally
appealing suggestions, leaving it to the decisionmaker to choose among them and construct the
arguments. Law professors will recognize this approach as one often employed by students on
examinations, commonly referred to as “shotgunning.”
198. Some legal theory recognizes a second argument: that the law requires a conclusion
other than the conclusion sought, but the law should be changed. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973). We regard this argument as relatively ineffective and doubt that
it is employed in any significant number of cases. Appellate courts sometimes characterize their
decisions as changes in the law, but legal doctrine is sufficiently indeterminate that the lawyer
need never concede that a change in the law is required to reach the desired conclusion—unless
the desired conclusion is not a victory in the case but the announcement of a change in the law.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (escaping the binding precedent of a
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conclusion sought.199 Even when a matter is within the “discretion” of
the court, a legal standard governing the exercise of that discretion
will almost certainly already exist.200 Formally, the argument—and the
judge’s explanation of the outcome—must be that application of the
standard for the exercise of that discretion requires the conclusion
sought.201
Despite the relative ineffectiveness of written law, in practice it
provides the sole basis for most legal argument. Nearly all written law
is sufficiently general, however, that a sophisticated opponent can
find substantial ambiguity in it as it would be applied in the case at
hand. The basic technique for discovering such ambiguity is a simple
one. The opponent examines each word of the proffered rule for am-
biguity. If even a single word is ambiguous, application of the rule is
ambiguous. Once that ambiguity is demonstrated, the opponent often
asserts a rule from another area of law that, if applied, would lead to
the opposite result in the case at hand.202 The proponent examines
that new rule for substantial ambiguity and the process repeats it-
self.203
line of “separate but equal” cases with the observation that “[w]hatever may have been the ex-
tent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that segregation
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored chil-
dren] is amply supported by modern authority”).
199. Even a standard that limits choices without compelling a single one logically can be re-
cast as a rule that permits particular choices but bars others. The idea that any statute can be
expressed as an if-then statement without changing its meaning originated with Layman Allen.
See Layman E. Allen & C. Rudy Engholm, Normalized Legal Drafting and the Query Method,
29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 380, 402-03 (1978) (describing statutes as if-then statements); see also Gray-
fred B. Gray, Reducing Unintended Ambiguity in Statutes: An Introduction to Normalization of
Statutory Drafting, 54 TENN. L. REV. 433, 436-44 (1987) (providing examples of statutes ex-
pressed as if-then statements). Accord DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION
136 (1997) (“The elements of the rule structure, or doctrine, are thousands of statements that
have the form, ‘If these facts are found, the judge should do this.’”).
200. See WALTER O. WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW:
LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 840-42 (1994) (enumerating legal
standards for the “best interests of the child” in custody disputes).
201. That is, the judge cannot say that he or she was entitled to reach either result but chose
one on the basis of personal preferences.
202. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (finding ambiguity in statutory
language stating that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void” and then accepting an argument based on prior law and
legislative history suggesting that a secured creditor’s lien could “pass through bankruptcy unaf-
fected”).
203. For example, assume that Peter buys an automobile from Paul under an installment
contract. Peter misses a payment and Paul sues for possession, citing U.C.C. section 9-503. That
statute provides that “a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collat-
eral.” U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995). In searching for a defense, Peter considers whether his missed
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If a party is unable to discover ambiguity in the rule proffered by
its opponent, the party can turn to any of a number of meta-rules to
invalidate the unambiguous rule: the rule is unconstitutional, the rule
was not properly adopted, the rule is not authoritative in this jurisdic-
tion, the (statutory) rule constitutes a scrivener’s error, the rule
should be changed because of changes in technology or society since
it was adopted, etc.204 Most recently, the Supreme Court has been im-
plicitly employing a test of “mandatory culpability” in the review of
criminal convictions. That is, the defendant must not only have vio-
lated the written law; the defendant must also be “culpable.”205 This
use of meta-rules to nullify rules mimics a technique employed both
in public debate and in computerized systems of analysis: when a pat-
tern of thought is unsuccessful, shift to a higher or lower level of gen-
erality.206 If the parties are sufficiently skillful in manipulating the
written law, the written law ultimately proves at least plausibly inde-
terminate.
Sophisticated lawyers argue the written law, but they anticipate
its indeterminacy. Understanding that content must be injected into
written law in every case, they ground their arguments in several
nondoctrinal rationales. These include social norms, the law in action,
payment constitutes a “default,” whether Paul is a “secured party,” and whether the automobile
is “collateral.” If, for instance, it is unclear whether missing a payment is a default, Peter might
assert the rule that a contract of adhesion is to be interpreted against the drafter. Paul would
then search for an avoidance by considering whether his installment contract is one of “adhe-
sion” and, if so, whether he is the “drafter.”
204. D’Amato provides an example in his response to Schauer’s argument that the attempt
of a person under 35 years of age to assume the Presidency of the United States would be an
“easy case.” D’Amato responds by pointing out that, through the strategy of assuming office
and forcing his adversaries to bring suit, the underage President might win on the basis that the
plaintiffs lack standing to sue or on grounds of mootness. See D’Amato, supra note 143, at 253-
54; see also supra note 160 (describing the strategic opportunities created by conflicting meta-
rules).
205. See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Fed-
eral Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1021-23 (1999) (documenting and advocating
use of the technique).
206. See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1984) (“Even if a specific rule exists that has no exceptions and that everyone
agrees how to apply . . . there is always a more general rule or principle that could plausibly be
used to nullify it . . . .”). Alternatively, the move can be from the general to the specific. For ex-
ample, in NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1999), the is-
sue was whether members of the press had the right to be present at the trial of a civil case. The
applicable statute provided in relevant part that “the sittings of every court shall be public.” Al-
though the rule was clear, the court side-stepped it by noting two decisions from California
courts closing trials for specific reasons despite the statute. See id. at 347-49. In this example, the
statute is the general proposition; the cases are the specific ones.
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Argument
from
Generalization of the
argument
Example of the argument
Social norms This is the fair thing to do. “An employer can’t fire an
employee based solely on
false accusations.”
Law in action
or legal out-
comes
This is the result reached
in like cases in the past.
“The evidence shows that
employees have never been
given hearings in cases such
as these.”
Law in law-
yers’ heads
This is what the law re-
quires.
“The law is clear that, unless
otherwise specified, em-
ployment is ‘at will’ and the
employee can be discharged
for any reason or for no rea-
son.”
Informal rules
of factual in-
ference
When fact A is present,
fact B is present as well.
“The defendant was late for
an important meeting; so
she was hurrying and there-
fore careless.”207
System im-
perative
Absent this result, the sys-
tem cannot operate as in-
tended.
“If this employee is entitled
to a hearing, then so are the
other 500,000 employees
discharged each year.”
Community
expectations
regarding out-
comes
This result is in accord
with commercial or com-
munity expectations.
“Most employees would be
shocked to learn that they
could be fired on the basis
of false accusations—with-
out being given the oppor-
tunity to present their side.”
Public policy This interpretation is in ac-
cord with the lawmakers’
intention.
“The reason for the rule is
that . . . .”
Figure 1
207. See ALBERT J. MOORE ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY 23-34 (1996) (presenting this exam-
ple).
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the law in lawyers’ heads, informal rules of factual inference, system
imperatives, community expectations regarding outcomes, and public
policy. Figure 1 contains illustrations of each kind of argument.
These arguments do not purport to be based in law. They pur-
port only to buttress the maker’s argument that the written law, cor-
rectly interpreted, requires the desired conclusion: “The law favors
our side, and this argument is proof of its wisdom and rationality in
doing so.” In actuality, arguments such as these are outcome-
determinative. If both lawyers are competent, both sides will have
sound arguments from legal doctrine. The side that is most persuasive
with their indirect arguments will almost always win. Through the
process of interpretation, the sources in the first column of the ta-
ble—spontaneously generated “private” law—are fused into and
made the content of the rules of law promulgated by the state.208
The inclusion of “public policy” in the category of “spontane-
ously generated private law” requires explanation. While arguments
from “public policy” are sometimes based on declarations of the leg-
islature made simultaneously with the promulgation of a statute or
declarations of a court made in the opinion that established the rule,
most “public policies” are invented by lawyers or law professors
based on examination of the rule itself. That is, they are mere specu-
lations on what the intent behind such a rule might be. When ac-
cepted by a decisionmaker, however, they can fix a single meaning to
a rule that on its face has several. Thus “public policy,” like social
norms, provides content to law.209 But public policy is a more flexible
device because the policy, unlike the norm, can spring wholly from
the strategist’s imagination.
Before a judge who believes legal doctrine determinate, the most
effective response to each of the arguments in the table is to point out
that the argument is grounded in something other than legal doctrine.
For example, in response to the argument from social norms, oppos-
ing counsel might reply that “my opponent argues that social norms
prohibit an employer from firing an employee for something the em-
ployee did not do. That may well be, but the law is to the contrary.”
Similarly, the best response to an argument that relies on informal
208. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 124, at 381 (“Thus interpretation becomes a method
by which private lawmaking and the printed rules of the state are fused.”).
209. See KENNEDY, supra note 199, at 133-56 (arguing that a formal structure of policy ar-
guments exists and that policy arguments are based ultimately in ideology). In contrast to our
theory, however, Kennedy regards the judge as the source of both the policy and the ideology.
See id. at 155-56.
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factual inference is probably to point out precisely the basis on which
the inference is being drawn. “My opponent argues that just because
a person was late for a meeting, you should infer that the person was
careless.”
Full articulation will damage these arguments and most legal
strategies, whether the articulation is by the opponent or by the pro-
ponent-strategist. To avoid that articulation, the proponent-strategist
should make its own argument sketchily and by innuendo—express-
ing just enough of the argument to reach the decisionmaker, but not
enough to alert the opponent to its nature or to destroy the argument
by full articulation. Weyrauch and Bell give the following example:
[I]t is difficult for a divorced husband to obtain custody of his
twelve-year-old daughter. There is an unarticulated cultural norm,
no matter how factually inaccurate, that a single adult male cannot
be trusted in an intimate living arrangement with a young female. It
would be impossible, however, to articulate this highly prejudicial
concern openly in court. Lawyers instead prefer veiled references to
sexual concerns by arguing that the daughter is “maturing” and
needs the guidance of the mother in “hygienic matters.”210
Once such an argument has reached the decisionmaker, full ar-
ticulation may be the best way to defuse it. The husband’s lawyer
points out that wife’s counsel is insinuating, without supporting evi-
dence, that the husband will sexually molest his daughter if the court
gives him custody. Thus restated, the argument loses its impact.
Normative content can be infused into otherwise empty legal
rules even before any case arises. That is, even though the ultimate
interpretation of a rule remains open as a technical or legal matter, if
a consensus forms in the relevant legal community that a particular
interpretation is “correct,” other interpretations may, as a practical
matter, be foreclosed. For example, when a new law is enacted, “ex-
perts” may promote a particular interpretation at judicial education
or continuing legal education programs.211 Even though the law is am-
biguous on its face, once a consensus forms in the relevant legal
community, individual judges may be under pressure to conform.
210. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 124, at 379 n.243.
211. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 103 (referring to actions of repeat players as “secur[ing]
the penetration of rules favorable to them”); accord WALTER O. WEYRAUCH, THE
PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 230-31 (1964) (referring to corresponding practices in Germany).
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
1450 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1405
B. Strategies That Constrain Judges
At least four types of legal strategy exist for pressuring judges
into a favorable resolution of a case without entirely persuading them
to it: case selection, making a record, legal planning, and media spin.
1. Case selection. In his landmark article, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead, Marc Galanter explained the many ways that
“repeat players”—who generally were business interests—could tip
the balance of law in their favor by selecting to litigate the cases most
likely to make favorable law.212 He advocated the development of
counterstrategies in which organizations of otherwise “single-shot”
players would do the same thing.213
To illustrate case selection as a legal strategy, assume that the
manufacturer of a product is interested in establishing that its product
is not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have filed
cases in which this issue might be raised in half a dozen state or fed-
eral courts spread throughout the United States. The manufacturer
begins by evaluating the six cases on a single criterion: if the plaintiff
raises the issue of whether the product is unreasonably dangerous as a
matter of law, what is the likelihood that the court will decide it in fa-
vor of the manufacturer? Assume that the likelihood of decision fa-
vorable to the manufacturer is 60% in each of two courts and 10% in
the four others.214 Assume also that the unfavorable courts are further
along in processing the cases, so that their decisions are likely to be
rendered first. Absent a case-selection strategy, the odds are nine-to-
one that the first decision will go against the manufacturer. With that
212. Galanter states:
Rule-development is shaped by a relatively autonomous learned tradition, by the im-
pingement of intellectual currents from outside, by the preferences and prudence of
the decision-makers. But courts are passive and these factors operate only when the
process is triggered by parties. The point here is merely to note the superior opportu-
nities of the [repeat player] to trigger promising cases and prevent the triggering of un-
promising ones.
Galanter, supra note 2, at 103 (emphasis added). Macaulay made essentially the same point ear-
lier in discussing the automobile manufacturers’ strategy in opposition to the Good Faith Act.
See STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 96-103 (1966).
213. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 141 (“The reform envisaged here is the organization of
‘have not’ parties . . . into coherent groups that have the ability to act in a coordinated fashion,
play long-run strategies, benefit from high-grade legal services, and so forth.”).
214. These differences may result from differences in the attitudes of decisionmakers re-
garding the legal issue or from entirely extralegal matters such as the particularly appealing or
unappealing nature of one of the parties.
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case argued as precedent,215 whether binding or not,216 the manufac-
turer’s chances of winning the next three cases probably sink even
lower. By the time the favorable courts reach the issue, the domino
effect of precedent may already have put four decisions unfavorable
to the manufacturer on the books. This “weight of authority,” per-
haps augmented by a “precedential cascade”217 effect against the
manufacturer’s position, may persuade the two remaining courts to
abandon their inclination in favor of the manufacturer.
The manufacturer could improve the odds of the case law devel-
oping in its favor by assuring that the two courts favorable to the
manufacturer218 are the first to render decisions. The manufacturer
could employ at least four tactics for accomplishing that result. First,
it could settle or delay the four cases pending in adverse courts so that
the courts did not decide them, or at least, did not decide them first.
Second, it could permit the cases to go forward to jury verdicts, but
without raising the issue of whether the product was unreasonably
dangerous as a matter of law. Third, it could strike a bargain with the
plaintiffs in the unfavorable courts that would tie the outcomes of
their cases to the outcomes in the two favorable courts and delay the
former until the latter were decided. The inducement might be the
elimination of much of the cost of litigation, or the guarantee of a
minimum recovery regardless of the outcome of the case.219 Lastly, af-
ter trying and losing the first cases, the manufacturer could enter into
215. Even when a court does not publish an opinion in the process of deciding the case, par-
ties who are aware of the decision are usually free to present the decision to a later court and
argue that the later court should follow it. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 171, at 286
(“Even though they cannot cite unpublished opinions, repeat litigants . . . are able to catalog
them and use their arguments. They also may request formal publication of those unpublished
opinions that they believe will make favorable precedent.”); Kurt Shuldberg, Digital Influence:
Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541,
569 (1997) (noting that “[s]ix circuits currently allow citation [of unpublished opinions], up from
only two circuits in 1994”).
216. Precedent set by a trial court typically would not bind a trial court in another district.
217. Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999) (arguing
that the spread of legal precedent may be augmented by a “cascade” effect that magnifies the
significance of early decisions).
218. Courts often indicate their intentions with regard to future rulings. In some cases, they
do so formally, but in most it is only by their demeanor or their rulings on preliminary issues.
219. While in practice, one of us was offered such an arrangement by an attorney for the
Internal Revenue Service. In that case, a single legal issue seemed likely to determine the out-
come. By accepting the IRS’s offer to tie the result in our case to the result in its other cases, the
client was spared the entire expense of litigation—which, in litigating against the IRS, could
easily have been more than the entire amount in issue. Even though the deal lowered our
chances of winning, we were more than compensated by the cost savings.
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settlement agreements conditioned upon the court not publishing an
opinion or upon the court sealing the file.220 By assuring that the fa-
vorable courts decide first, the manufacturer puts favorable law on
the books for use in arguing subsequent cases.
Though the strategy of case selection has been sufficiently effec-
tive to draw the attention of legal scholars, it remains relatively weak.
Case selection is a means of generating written law favorable to one’s
position. However, litigation is unlikely to establish written law in any
given case, and, as previously noted, even once established, written
law is not very powerful.221
2. Making a record. Appellate courts decide cases on the record
and the written and oral arguments of counsel.222 The record consists
of selected portions of the pleadings and other documents filed in the
case, transcripts of what transpired orally, and evidence offered. The
appellate court may reverse the decision because the court below de-
cided it wrongly or because the lower court did not follow appropriate
procedures, as indicated by the record.
220. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in
the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 390-95 (1999) (discussing the sealing of
court records pursuant to settlement agreements); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify
Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 764-65 (1995) (discussing the
practice of vacating published opinions when requested by the parties upon later settlement of
the case); Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law
Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 596 (1991) (discussing the benefits
to the unsuccessful litigant who then negotiates a settlement with her adversary to request the
court to vacate the judgment).
221. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 2, at 149-50 (observing that “[t]he system has the capacity
to change a great deal at the level of rules without corresponding changes in everyday patterns
of practice or distribution of tangible advantages”).
222. The factual accounts of appellate lawyers have an impact on outcomes, even when they
are not supported by the record. In appellate arguments, lawyers often functionally present
themselves as witnesses, either spontaneously or in response to questions posed by judges. The
effect is to avoid cross-examination and exclusionary rules of evidence. (The pejorative terms
for such accounts when made orally is “blurting out.”) Objection to such oral accounts is made
difficult by a socio-legal norm that prohibits objections to oral arguments except in the most ex-
treme circumstances. Brandeis briefs have also been described as a way to “bring facts into the
judgment that have not been entered into the record.” Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The
Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV.
91, 94 n.5 (1993). The original Brandeis brief, filed in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), was
an egregious example. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 443 n.341 (1988) (“Much of the brief consisted of statements by
workers that they liked factory legislation.”).
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When litigating a case, the lawyers generally have an incentive to
“make a record” favorable to their own position. The record may be
useful in overturning an adverse decision on appeal, or defending a
favorable one.
Strategic opportunities abound. To maximize the possibility of
reversal on appeal, the lawyer may make frequent objections, may at-
tempt to incite the judge to intemperate action,223 may proffer evi-
dence or testimony of questionable admissibility, or may argue posi-
tions ineffectually in the hope of leading the court into reversible
error.
These strategies can become complex. For example, a lawyer
who actually hopes to win the case may create the impression that he
or she is just making a record for appeal. The court, knowing of this
hostile intent, may be reluctant to rule against the lawyer on particu-
lar issues for fear that the ruling will provide the basis for reversal.
The result may be that the lawyer gets the benefit of every doubt on
the hundreds of legal issues that arise in a typical case.224 Merely
bringing a court reporter to a hearing may have the same threatening
effect.
Appellate courts assume that the judges below had legally ac-
ceptable reasons for their decisions unless the records affirmatively
show that they did not.225 For that reason, a judge who does not wish
to be reversed on appeal is best advised to give no more explanation
than is legally required.226 That is what most judges do. They listen to
arguments and sign an order stating the outcome of the case, but they
223. See, e.g., United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 985 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The tactic of a
lawyer in a losing cause who tries to provoke the trial judge into error is an old one, well exhib-
ited by LeFevour’s counsel, who was twice held in contempt in the course of the trial.”); Terry
Carter, Playing Hardball at Microsoft: Chief Counsel William Neukom is Leading a Legal
Charge that Verges on Either the Risky or Brilliant or Both, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 24-25
(speculating that the attorney for Microsoft may have been attempting “to provoke the judge
into appealable error”).
224. To counter the strategy of a lawyer who is making a record for appeal, the court may
rule in favor of the lawyer on nondeterminative matters to prevent reversal on appeal, and then
rule against the lawyer on the case itself, perhaps couching the decision as one on the facts and
thus difficult to overturn.
225. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 111-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (considering de-
fendant appellee’s four theories for sustaining the court’s order of dismissal in a case where the
court gave no reason for its ruling).
226. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (requiring federal judges to make findings of fact in cases
tried without juries).
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either give no reasons or they give their reasons in a perfunctory
manner.227
The task of a lawyer-strategist who seeks reversal is to get the
judge to articulate an unacceptable reason for the decision. The law-
yer might do that by directly asking the reasons for the ruling, or by
accusing the judge of employing a particular line of reasoning,
thereby provoking a response.228 Alternatively, the lawyer might make
a series of motions or proffers that, when ruled upon, eliminate par-
ticular lines of reasoning as possible explanations for the overall deci-
sion.229
For present purposes, the key is to understand that these strate-
gies are not meant to persuade the trial judge—or in many instances
the appellate judge either—to the lawyer’s position. The goal may be
to intimidate the trial judge or to make sure that the case is decided
on ancillary issues in the appellate court. Although reversal on ancil-
lary issues is not automatically victory, it can get the lawyer a “second
bite at the apple”—another trial at another time, in different circum-
stances, and perhaps with a different trial judge—and is also highly
likely to lead to settlement.230
3. Legal planning. The term “legal planning” is used broadly to
refer to action taken before contemplated litigation in an attempt to
establish what will become the facts of that litigation.231 Professor Leo
Katz provides the following examples of particularly strategic legal
planning:
(3) A lawyer suggests to a client who owns a farm that she incorpo-
rate the farm and declare herself its employee in order to qualify for
social security. . . . (5) A lawyer recommends to elderly clients that
they distribute their assets to their children so that they qualify for
governmental assistance more quickly. (6) A lawyer recommends
that a client turn most of its employees into independent contractors
227. The typical order provides that “upon the plaintiff’s motion for [relief] and the court
having heard the argument of counsel it is hereby ordered and adjudged that [decision].”
228. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1974) (describing an
instance in which one of the authors of this Article successfully employed this strategy).
229. See, e.g., Dynes v. Dynes, 637 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
trial court’s rejection of proffered evidence of a witness’s reputation for dishonesty fatally un-
dermined the court’s findings of fact, which were based solely on that witness’s testimony).
230. See David F. Pike, Retrials: A Bad Case of Deja Vu, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 31, 1981, at 1, 27
(noting that “retrials are relatively rare” and explaining the reasons).
231. Professor Galanter refers to it as “restructur[ing] the transaction to escape the thrust of
the . . . rule.” Galanter, supra note 2, at 149.
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to escape the burden of social security taxes or even simple tort li-
ability.232
The planner may conceive of his or her purpose as avoiding liti-
gation,233 but the plan typically accomplishes that only by assuring
that, in the event of litigation, the planner’s side would win.
The strategies Katz suggests consist of creating fact patterns that
satisfy the antecedents of legal rules, and thus achieving the desired
results. However, as we have seen, legal rules are not, in and of them-
selves, of much effect. For virtually any legal rule that would achieve
the planner’s objectives, there is another rule or doctrine that could
be used to attack it. Corporate veils can be pierced; security interests
can be subordinated; contracts can be rescinded, reformed or invali-
dated; and conveyances can be avoided. At a minimum, such planning
is always vulnerable to attack as a “sham” or a “subterfuge.”234
The sophisticated planner realizes that norms, customs, system
imperatives, expectations regarding outcomes, and other informal
bases for decisionmaking likely will be determinative. Accordingly,
sophisticated planning will proceed largely on the basis of appear-
ances. To illustrate the difference, consider the circumstances of a
debtor who expects to file bankruptcy soon and wishes to keep as
much property as possible. Mere attention to legal doctrine might
suggest that the debtor convert all of the debtor’s assets to exempt
property, leaving it to the court to determine which of the conversions
were made with fraudulent intent. But the strategist who took a
broader view would realize that the greed and lack of consideration
evidenced by that strategy would likely turn the court against the
debtor. Bankruptcy lawyers express this truth in the familiar apho-
rism that “pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered.”235 Similarly, if the law
exempts an automobile of a specified value, the doctrinalist might as-
232. Katz, supra note 7, at 566.
233. See, e.g., LOUIS M. BROWN & EDWARD A. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS:
MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS xix (1978) (“As contrasted with dispute-
resolving law, preventive law . . . deals with the avoidance of dispute, and with the structuring of
relations and transactions apart from any extant dispute.”).
234. See, e.g., Lubrizol Corp. v. Cardinal Constr. Co., 868 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir. 1989) (not-
ing that the various names given to the cause of action that seeks to hold one corporation liable
for the acts of another, including “sham corporation,” are not analytically helpful and instead
“cloud the thinking of lawyers and judges”).
235. E.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a
Bankruptcy Debtor’s Right to Tithe, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1223, 1264 n.170 (1998) (quoting the
popular aphorism in the context of bankruptcy exemption planning).
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sume that the model and color were irrelevant.236 The sophisticated
strategist, by contrast, would immediately recognize the difference
between purchasing a staid blue Chevy Caprice and a flashy red Cor-
vette—even if the dollar amounts of the two purchases were identi-
cal.237
Legal planning is often an effort to persuade rather than con-
strain the court. Judges are to some degree politicians. Even those
with lifetime appointments often seek higher offices or professional
acclaim. To those ends, they seek low rates of reversal and reputa-
tions for sound, responsible decisionmaking. Despite the lack of any
doctrinally-recognized difference between a Corvette and a Caprice,
the former projects an image of extravagance and privilege that most
observers would consider to be inappropriate for a person who is dis-
charging debts in bankruptcy. The latter projects an image of practical
necessity that fits more comfortably with bankruptcy discharge. A
judge is therefore more likely to suffer criticism for permitting a
debtor to retain a Corvette than a Caprice of the same dollar value.
4. Media spin. Because judges care what members of the
profession and the public think of them, they are vulnerable to media
spin regarding the cases that come before them. To release a
defendant who was probably guilty of the crime charged because the
police violated the defendant’s rights is a great deal more difficult
when the crime is a heinous one that has caught the press’s attention.
For that very reason, the prosecutor who wants to win the case has an
incentive to make sure the crime catches the attention of the press. F.
Lee Bailey, a highly successful trial lawyer in the 1960s and 1970s, was
notorious for arguing his cases in the press, thereby “seeking to create
a force outside the courts with the expectation and intention that the
force so created would produce a desired result in a particular case
236. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 48 (discussing the relevance of model and color of an
automobile in a negligence hypothetical).
237. See Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: “Don’t
Look Back—Something May Be Gaining On You”, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 190 n.189 (1994)
(stating that “[i]t is often the attempt to extract the last dime of illegal profit that raises creditor
and court ire”).
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within the courts.”238 Since Bailey’s heyday, the standards for what is
acceptable have been liberalized.239
For the past two decades, manufacturers and insurers have been
campaigning in the mass media against high jury verdicts and ex-
panded remedies.240 Ironically, the campaign seems to have had more
effect on judges than on jurors. Recent studies show astonishingly
high rates of verdict reductions or reversals by both trial and appel-
late courts.241
C. Strategies That Transcend Judges
The most interesting types of strategies are those that seek a par-
ticular result “in spite, if you please, of what the judges in a case of
dispute may be expected to do.”242 These are legal strategies that seek
to prevent the other side from obtaining an adjudication or that seek
to control who the adjudicator will be.
1. Cost strategies. Legal remedies are available only through
litigation.243 Litigation is expensive and can be made more so by the
manner in which it is conducted. For example, by expanding the
issues in litigation, a party can expand the scope of discovery or the
238. In re Bailey, 273 A.2d 563, 566 (N.J. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact,
as a result of disciplinary proceedings arising from Bailey’s penchant for publicizing cases, he
was suspended from practicing pro hoc vice in New Jersey for a period of one year. See id. at
567.
239. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality
opinion) (“An attorney’s duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. . . . [A]n attorney may
take reasonable steps to defend a client’s reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of
indictment . . . . including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the cli-
ent does not deserve to be tried.”); Robert L. Shapiro, For the Defense, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
105, 109 (1996) (“Most sophisticated city and county prosecutorial offices now have professional
public relations personnel to manage press coverage and disseminate information about an on-
going case.”).
240. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Jus-
tice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 747 (1998) (discussing “corporate investment in projecting an
image of unrestrained litigiousness and rampant overclaiming” and its “paradoxical effect of
increasing the level of claiming”); William Glaberson, Some Plaintiffs Losing Out in Texas’ War
on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1999, at A1 (describing the campaign against plaintiffs’ ver-
dicts in Texas).
241. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 172; Margaret Cronin Fisk, Now You See It,
Now You Don’t, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 28, 1998, at C1 (discussing a study of 100 representative large
verdicts of $1 million or more in 1994, about two-thirds of which were reduced or set aside).
242. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 14.
243. That is, courts do not grant remedies or enter orders in the absence of a case filed by
some party.
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opportunity to employ experts. Depositions may be taken in
geographically remote areas, putting the opposing party to the
expense of attending. Retention of experts by one party ordinarily
necessitates the retention of other experts by the opposing party.244 As
a result, it may cost millions of dollars in out-of-pocket costs for
plaintiffs to prepare for trial a simple dispute over whether the
dumping of toxic chemicals caused a cluster of children’s leukemia.245
Occasionally, a party is able to win a case by exhausting the other
side’s resources, or to prevent the bringing of a case by eliminating
the other side’s resources,246 though the more common result is
settlement of such a case at a discount.247
A manufacturer’s or seller’s announcement that it will defend all
cases to final decisions by the courts, without consideration of settle-
ment, can, in some situations, dramatically reduce the number of
cases that are cost-effective to litigate.248 For example, the cigarette
companies “decided they would defend every claim, no matter what
the cost, through trial and any possible appeals” and held to that pol-
icy for thirty-five years.249 The strategy was phenomenally successful.
At the end of those thirty-five years, few cases had come to trial, and
the companies had not paid out a cent in tort awards.250
244. See, e.g., Karen Donovan, Squirm Time for Milberg Weiss, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at
A1 (quoting class-action lawyer Melvyn I. Weiss, a frequent user of expert witnesses, to the ef-
fect that “[e]xpert witnesses neutralize each other”). The experts testify regarding issues of fact,
issues of foreign law, and increasingly, issues of domestic law. See, e.g., Bookhardt v. State, 710
So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (permitting expert testimony on legal meaning of the term
“security”). See also Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1984) (arguing that
courts do, and should, ignore the prohibition on expert legal testimony).
245. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 9 (describing the great trial-preparation costs to plaintiffs in
the Woburn, Massachusetts, suit alleging harmful effects of a leak from a toxic dump into
drinking water supplies).
246. See, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Superior Ct. of La., 61 F. Supp.
2d 499 (E.D. La. 1999) (upholding the state and federal constitutionality of the Louisiana busi-
ness community’s decision to dismantle the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic to prevent the
bringing of certain kinds of cases).
247. See HARR, supra note 9, at 405-48 (describing cost pressures toward settlement in a
complex environmental case).
248. This would be a cost-effective strategy where the increased costs of litigating every case
are outweighed by the savings from not having to defend or pay settlements in cases where the
strategy discourages plaintiffs from pursing their claims.
249. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 857 (1992).
250. See id. at 874 (“Thus, after thirty-five years of litigation, the tobacco industry could still
maintain the notable claim that it had not paid out a cent in tort awards.”).
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2. Delay strategies. Litigation takes time, and defendants can
expand the amount required by the manner in which they respond.251
An award of the same relief at a later time may be less valuable to the
plaintiff or less costly to the defendant.252 For example, if the court
delays the entry of an order barring a competitor’s illegal practices,
the competitor may succeed in driving the plaintiff out of business in
the interim. Damages may not be an adequate substitute, because the
damages actually incurred might be too speculative to recover253 or
the judgment for those damages might not be collectible.254
Delay may reduce the expected value of a lawsuit by reducing
the plaintiff’s chances of winning. Witnesses may die or disappear.
Evidence may be altered or destroyed. The pattern of judicial or
community attitudes that made the case worth bringing may change.
The damage inflicted on the plaintiff by the defendant’s wrongful act
may become less poignant with the passage of time—perhaps through
the death of the plaintiff. The plaintiff may become discouraged by
the passage of time, or become less determined or less able to devote
the necessary resources.
Delay may also reduce the plaintiff’s chances of collecting any
money judgment that may be rendered; that is, a defendant that is not
judgment-proof at the commencement of litigation may become
judgment-proof by its conclusion.255 The defendant may even be able
251. See David E. Rovella, High-profile Conn. Lawyer Disappears, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 22,
1999, at A19 (noting that “[f]ellow stars of the Connecticut defense bar were unequivocal in
their admiration for [attorney] Francis Mac Buckley . . . . His capacity to delay cases, it is said, is
legendary”).
252. See, e.g., Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A
Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 893 n.9
(1984) (suggesting situations in which a defendant can benefit from a meritless appeal by earn-
ing sufficient interest on the plaintiff’s judgment to cover the costs of the appeal and earn a
margin of profit). For an example of an ultimately unsuccessful use of this strategy, see Hersch
v. Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 194 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), in which the court added
$125,000 to the plaintiff’s damage award because the defendant had pursued a frivolous appeal
that was made profitable only by the fact that it could earn interest on the plaintiff’s judgment
award during the term of the appeal. See id. at 638.
253. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. IAG Int’l Acceptance Group, N.V., 28 F. Supp. 2d
126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“While lost profits need not be established with ‘mathematical preci-
sion,’ they must be ‘capable of measurement based upon known reliable factors without undue
speculation.’” (quoting Ashland Mgt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 403 (1993))).
254. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-38 (1996) (de-
scribing strategies by which a defendant can protect its assets so as to render itself “judgment-
proof”).
255. As a general rule, without a judgment from a court, a creditor cannot interfere with a
debtor’s use of its property. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
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to delay until the case becomes moot.256 When cases settle, the
amounts of the settlements are likely be discounted for the time, ex-
pense, and uncertainty that would have been involved in completing
the litigation.
The fact that delay affects case outcomes is widely recognized.
What is not widely recognized is the capacity of legal strategy to ma-
nipulate the extent of delay.257 Strategies that can change the extent of
delay can change both the parties’ chances of winning and the
amounts by which their cases will be discounted in early settlements.
Various rules of law may seem to prohibit strategies that seek
delay, but, on close examination, they prove ambiguous. Thus, for ex-
ample, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose on
lawyers an obligation to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litiga-
tion” but only “consistent with the interests of the client.”258 The
comment to that rule provides that “[d]elay should not be indulged
merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for the purpose of
frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or
repose.”259 The term “merely” suggests that deliberate delay is accept-
able strategy when those motives coincide with loftier ones, even if
the loftier ones are of little weight in the decision. Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure refers to “unnecessary delay” as an
“improper purpose,”260 suggesting that delay is a proper purpose when
the delay is “necessary.” The effect of these ambiguities is to provide
Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999) (holding that because of this general rule, in the instant case, “the
District Court had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing [debtor] petitioners
from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of the [creditor] respondents’ contract claim
for damages”).
256. See, e.g., Board of Sch. Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975) (holding that a case
brought by six high school students for interference with their First Amendment rights with re-
spect to a school newspaper was moot because the students had graduated by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court).
257. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 2, at 121 (treating delay as merely the product of institu-
tional overload); id. at 139 (suggesting that an “increase in institutional facilities for processing
claims” would be sufficient to eliminate delay). Rule 3.2 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct misses the legal strategy point when it states that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1999) (emphasis added). Read literally, the rule authorizes
every delaying tactic that benefits the client because elimination of that delay would be incon-
sistent with the interests of the client.
258. Id.
259. Id. cmt. 1.
260. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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the basis for an array of strategies that lawyers can use to pursue, or
counter, delaying strategies.
3. Extralegal strategies. Much strategic effort is devoted to
extralegal means of deterring those entitled to legal remedies from
suing or from continuing suits already filed. These efforts range from
common courtesy—an airline’s making relatives comfortable and
providing them with information in the days immediately following a
fatal crash—to physical violence. Between those extremes are a
variety of pressures that parties to a litigable dispute can apply against
their opponents. One can embarrass an opponent by the kinds of
questions asked in trial or in deposition, or by the nature of the
matters inquired into in discovery. One can make an opponent’s life
unpleasant by conducting litigation in an uncivil manner. One can
threaten an opponent—perhaps explicitly, but more likely
implicitly—with the loss of business relationships, unwanted publicity,
the loss of a job, criminal prosecution,261 deportation,262 or
embarrassment in matters having no direct relationship to the
litigation. Or one can go entirely outside the law, fabricating
evidence, bribing judges,263 or murdering witnesses.264
The effect of these extralegal strategies on patterns of litigation is
difficult to overestimate. Businesses tend to sue their trading partners
261. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992)
(finding that “[t]he Model Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from using the possibility of present-
ing criminal charges against the opposing party in a private civil matter to gain relief for a client,
provided that the criminal matter is related to the client’s civil claim”). Statutes in some states
may, nevertheless, prohibit the practice.
262. For example, illegal aliens may have difficulty in claiming their legal rights because they
fear that the opposing party will discover their status and bring it to the attention of the immi-
gration authorities. See, e.g., HARROP A. FREEMAN & HENRY WEIHOFEN, CLINICAL LAW
TRAINING: INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 208-09 (1972) (summarizing a divorce case in
which the husband used threats of deportation to discourage his Canadian wife from asserting
her rights in the divorce proceedings).
263. The bribery of judges has been a recurring problem in the American legal system. See,
e.g., United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 665 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming a Chicago judge’s con-
viction for accepting bribes in murder cases); 2 Judges Guilty in Florida Corruption Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A18 (reporting the conviction of two Dade County, Florida,
judges for bribery).
264. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Harris, Whither the Witness? The Federal Government’s Special
Duty of Protection in Criminal Proceedings After Piechowicz v. United States, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1285, 1302-03 (1991) (discussing the problem of protecting witnesses in criminal cases and
proposing a duty for the government to protect federal criminal witnesses who are threatened,
based, inter alia, on knowledge or reasonable foreseeability that the witness is in danger).
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only when the business relationship expires.265 A recent empirical
study found that only one in fifty patients with a valid claim for mal-
practice against a medical provider actually made the claim.266 Cases
against professional killers or other violent felons are notoriously dif-
ficult to bring because witnesses understandably fear for their lives.267
4. Contractual strategies. Through a variety of contracts, legal
strategists can install their allies as decisionmakers, bar the bringing
of otherwise meritorious cases, or shift risks to persons who do not
realize their magnitude. Examples of the first are contracts that
require arbitration of customer claims against industry by arbitrators
whose primary loyalty is likely to be to the industry.268 Examples of
the second are contracts in which customers waive their right to sue
the businesses they patronize. An example of the third is an
agreement in which the customer indemnifies the company against
claims by third parties.269
265. See Tahirih V. Lee, Risky Business: Courts, Culture, and the Marketplace, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1335, 1409 (1996) (“Litigation makes sense only if merchants expect to profit beyond
the breakdown of the business relationship.”); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations In
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61-62 (1963) (finding that parties in long-
term business relationships litigate only when reputational sanctions fail, usually in situations
involving high stakes or the termination of the relationship); see also MACAULAY, supra note
212, at xv (“Once their franchises have been terminated, [automobile dealers] have been willing
to sue.”). Professor Galanter notes that “the more inclusive in life-space and temporal span a
relationship between parties, the less likely it is that those parties will resort to the official sys-
tem.” Galanter, supra note 2, at 130 (footnotes omitted).
266. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 73 (1993) (describing a hospital
review where only 8 out of 280 patients with “identifiable negligent injury” actually filed
claims).
267. See John C. Jeffries & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advan-
tages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1113 (1995) (“Most civilian witnesses in
organized crime investigations—extortion victims, relatives of murder victims, and chance eye-
witnesses—are extremely reluctant to testify. Often they refuse to do so even in the secrecy of
the grand jury.”).
268. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 936-39 (1999) (describing a hypothetical case
where a consumer purchases a computer through an advertisement and finds inside the box a
binding contract that includes the requirement that all claims be arbitrated “in Phoenix, Arizona
before a panel of three retired industry executives”). But see UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: HOW INVESTORS FARE 35-39 (1992) (find-
ing securities investors no more likely to prevail in an “independent” forum, such as the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, than in industry-sponsored forums such as the New York Stock
Exchange or the National Association of Securities Dealers).
269. See, e.g., United Servs. Automobile Ass’n v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d
742, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (analyzing a car rental contract under which a consumer renter
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In most of these circumstances, the strategy is both contemplated
and authorized by legal doctrine. That is, policymakers have made a
deliberate choice to permit customers to waive their rights. But legal
strategy is capable of extending these contracts and waivers beyond
the limits contemplated or authorized. For example, Professor Kath-
erine Van Wezel Stone documents how legal strategists for industry
have transformed the Federal Arbitration Act from a guarantor of a
level playing field to a tool for the oppression of employees or cus-
tomers.270
5. Forum shopping. Given what we have already said about the
ineffectiveness of legal doctrine, the fact that different
decisionmakers reach different results on the same legal doctrine
should not be surprising.271 To take advantage of those differences,
legal strategists have devised numerous ways of controlling who will
decide a dispute. In some circumstances, legal doctrine deliberately
indemnified a car rental company against claims of third parties arising out of use of the auto-
mobile). Most providers of Internet access, including Microsoft Network, require that the cus-
tomer indemnify the provider against litigation arising out of the customer’s use of the Internet.
Probably few users of the Microsoft Network realize they have agreed to pay Microsoft’s attor-
neys’ fees, in a defense managed by Microsoft, in the event that a third party sues the user for
libel and joins Microsoft as a defendant. Microsoft’s contract provides:
You agree to indemnify MSP and Microsoft from and against any and all liabilities,
expenses (including attorneys’ fees) and damages arising out of claims based upon use
of your MSN account, including any claim of libel, defamation, violation of rights of
privacy or publicity, loss of service by other Members and infringement of intellectual
property or other rights. MSP will notify you promptly of any claim for which MSP or
Microsoft seeks indemnification and will afford you the opportunity to participate in
the defense of such claim, provided that your participation will not be conducted in a
manner prejudicial to MSP’s or Microsoft’s interests, as reasonably determined by
MSP or Microsoft.
Indemnification (visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://memberservices.msn.com/gettingstarted/
guidelines/memberagreement.htm#Section12> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
270. See Stone, supra note 268, at 938-41 (lamenting that a contract to arbitrate in an un-
usual forum with a panel chosen by industry could be enforceable even though the contract—
found inside the package after it was purchased—made no mention of arbitration, referring only
to “the rules and regulations of the Computer Manufacturer’s Industry Trade Association”).
271. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999)
(analyzing rampant forum shopping in cases under the United States Bankruptcy Code); Ed
Flynn, Confirmation Rates By Judge, 1989-1996 (July 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (showing five U.S. Bankruptcy judges as confirming reorganization
plans in fewer than 10% of their cases and six confirming plans in more than 50% of their
cases). Some portion of the difference in the confirmation rates reported by Flynn may be at-
tributable to differences in types of cases assigned to the judges, but the differences are too
great to be entirely accounted for by that factor.
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affords the party filing the case a choice among courts272 or even
among judges of a single court.273 The most prominent example is the
right of a plaintiff to sue a defendant in any jurisdiction in which the
defendant does business.274 Most plaintiffs so entitled use their “venue
privilege” to bring their actions in the jurisdiction most convenient for
them. But some choose the jurisdiction for the likelihood that its
courts will rule in their favor.275
The doctrines that initially afford plaintiffs choices among courts
may also give opposing parties means of upsetting the plaintiffs’
choices, leading to an interaction of strategies. For example, if the
plaintiff files a case against an out-of-state defendant, the defendant
may have the right to remove the case to the federal court.276 Plaintiffs
who anticipate the possibility of removal may be able to prevent it by
joining additional defendants,277 by suing only on state law causes of
272. For example, in Florida, most civil suits may be filed “in the county where the defen-
dant resides,” or “in the county where the cause of action accrued.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.011
(West 1994). Some actions can be filed in state court or federal court. See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Courts § 97 (1995) (“[I]n diversity of citizenship cases, the jurisdiction of federal courts is con-
current with that of state courts, provided the amount involved meets the minimum specified by
Congress for an action to be brought in a federal court.”).
273. For example, Wisconsin and California statutes give each party to the case the option
to remove one judge. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 170.6 (West Supp. 2000) (providing for
substitution of judges based on an affidavit that the judge is prejudiced against any party or at-
torney). The filing of the affidavit may establish prejudice even without a judicial determination
that the prejudice exists. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 329 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1958). See also WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West 1999):
(1) Any party to a civil action or proceeding may file a written request, signed per-
sonally or by his or her attorney, with the clerk of courts for a substitution of a new
judge for the judge assigned to the case. . . . (2) When the clerk receives a request for
substitution, the clerk shall immediately contact the judge whose substitution has
been requested for a determination of whether the request was made timely and in
proper form. If the request is found to be timely and in proper form, the judge named
in the request has no further jurisdiction and clerk shall request the assignment of an-
other judge . . . .
274. See B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1108-19
(1990) (describing the legal basis for jurisdiction over causes of action that did not arise out of
the defendant’s activities in the forum).
275. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An
Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion”, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 354-55 (1994) (quoting Lord
Denning’s description of how numerous cases involving injuries suffered on North Sea oil rigs
were filed in Texas due to the possibility of larger verdicts in the United States than overseas).
276. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994) (authorizing removal “if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought”).
277. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3, 7 (1992) (“[A]
plaintiff trying to avoid removal to federal court might add defendants who are from the same
state.”); Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail
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action,278 by requesting particular relief,279 by suing in the defendant’s
home state,280 or by otherwise destroying diversity.281 Defendants who
on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369, 1374-75 (1988) (“Plaintiffs who wish to avoid re-
moval to federal court may do so if they can join, in addition to the non-resident defendant, a
resident defendant, thus avoiding the complete diversity of citizenship that is a prerequisite to
federal court jurisdiction.”). The doctrinal limit on this strategy is that the joinder cannot be
“fraudulent.” See Marble v. American Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 571, 573
(N.D. Miss. 1998) (quoting Rodriguez v. Sabatino, 120 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1997)):
To prove that non-diverse parties have been fraudulently joined in order to defeat di-
versity, the removing party must demonstrate either “outright fraud in the plaintiff’s
recitation of jurisdictional facts,” or that “there is absolutely no possibility that the
plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in
state court.”
278. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff is
“the master of the claim” and may choose to avoid removal by omitting federal law claims from
the initial complaint).
279. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1937) (“If [the
plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the federal court he may resort to the expedient of
suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the
defendant cannot remove.”). But see De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir.
1995) (“The inquiry, however, does not end merely because the plaintiff alleges damages below
the threshold. The face of the plaintiff’s pleading will not control if made in bad faith.”).
Divorce courts are regarded as generally favorable venues for persons seeking alimony
and child support; bankruptcy courts are regarded as less favorable. Bankruptcy lawyers devel-
oped the strategy of attacking divorce court awards of alimony and child support (which are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy) by characterizing them as disguised property settlements (which
are dischargeable in bankruptcy). After decades of final dispositions of such cases by the bank-
ruptcy courts, divorce lawyers hit on the strategy of returning to the divorce court to seek modi-
fication of the divorce decree to award post-bankruptcy alimony and child support on the
grounds of “changed circumstances.” See, e.g., In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an alimony modification granted by a divorce court and based on “changed cir-
cumstances” created by a bankruptcy discharge did not constitute an effort to collect discharged
debt in violation of Bankruptcy Code § 524); Dickson v. Dickson, 474 S.E.2d 165, 169-71 (Va.
Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the discharge in bankruptcy of an equitable distribution obligation
the debtor owed to his former spouse under the divorce decree justified an increase in support
payments from the discharged debtor); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 283 (3d ed. 1997).
280. See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59,
73 n.55 (1997) (“A plaintiff can always avoid removal on diversity grounds, however, by filing a
suit in the defendant’s home state.”).
281. See, e.g., Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 188-90 (1931) (allowing an
Oklahoma administratrix to resign and a Louisiana administrator to be appointed to destroy
diversity so an action could be brought in Louisiana). The statute has more recently been
amended to make the decedent’s residence determinative. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (1994)
(“[T]he legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of
the same State as the decedent . . . .”). Sometimes, the strategies used to shop between state and
federal courts are remarkably imaginative. When a Texas state court jury returned a $50 million
verdict against Crown Life Insurance Co.—then admittedly a private company—Crown re-
sponded by persuading a Saskatchewan government agency to convert debt owed by Crown’s
parent company to the agency into nonvoting equity. Crown then returned to court with the ar-
gument that it was a “foreign state” entitled to removal of the case from state court to federal
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fear adjudication by a state or federal trial court can sometimes avoid
it by filing for bankruptcy and having the initial adjudication made by
the bankruptcy court as a determination of the amount of the plain-
tiff’s claim.282
With respect to some types of actions, the party who would
otherwise be the defendant can file first, thereby seizing the venue
privilege for itself. These actions include divorces,283 bankruptcies,284
and virtually any matter that can be the subject of an action for
declaratory relief.285 Parties with bargaining leverage may attempt to
control venue through a contract provision imposed at the time of the
initial transaction.286
The system’s response to these kinds of strategies is to pass or
create laws, such as the doctrine of forum non conveniens,287 that
authorize judges to transfer cases. But these laws fall far short of pro-
viding an antidote to forum shopping for legal outcomes. First, these
laws do not even theoretically contemplate a single, most appropriate
venue for each case. Second, in at least some contexts, practical and
court and to have its case heard without a jury. See Larry M. Greenberg, Canadian Insurer
Crown Life Becomes a “Foreign State” as It Loses U.S. Suit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A5.
282. See, e.g., In re Apex Oil Co., 91 B.R. 860, 865 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (assuming juris-
diction to estimate the Department of Energy’s claims against a debtor over the Department’s
objections).
283. See, e.g., Martin v. Fuqua, 539 S.W.2d 314, 315-16 (Ky. 1976) (holding that where a
husband and wife filed divorce actions in different counties, only the first case filed should pro-
ceed).
284. The first court in which a bankruptcy case is filed by or against a particular debtor con-
trols venue. See Bankr. Rule 1014(b), 11 U.S.C. app. (1994). In preparation for filing bankruptcy
in New York, Baldwin-United, a Cincinnati company, established a New York headquarters.
Creditors filed an involuntary case in Cincinnati just minutes before Baldwin-United filed its
New York case. Unlikely to win the venue fight, and apparently fearful of offending the Cincin-
nati judge, Baldwin-United dismissed its New York filing without a fight. See Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 28 n.60.
285. See, e.g., League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728, 769 (5th Cir. 1993)
(noting that, under Texas rules on venue, “a party who anticipates being sued may ‘capture’
venue by filing suit first”) (citation omitted).
286. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding a
contract provision providing for venue in Miami, Florida, for a Washington plaintiff injured on a
cruise between Los Angeles and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico). Similarly, Microsoft’s contract of
adhesion for Internet access provides for venue in King’s County, Washington, for all actions
arising out of the customer’s relationship with Microsoft. See supra note 269.
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) (authorizing a district court to change venue “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses”); In re Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir.
1987) (upholding a dismissal due to forum non conveniens where the incident occurred in India,
all plaintiffs were Indian citizens, and “the proof bearing on the issues to be tried [was] almost
entirely located in India”).
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
2000] A THEORY OF LEGAL STRATEGY 1467
political pressures on judges have caused a general failure in the
venue correction process.288 Internationally, no correction mechanism
may exist at all.289 Empirical studies suggest that the struggle over
venue is often outcome-determinative.290
Forum shopping among the judges of a single court is generally
prohibited, and violations are usually treated as serious violations of
legal ethics.291 The predictable differences in legal outcomes across
judges are, however, so great that legal strategists continue to find
ways of picking their judges. The simplest means is to file the case in a
court that has only a single judge,292 or in a court that will advise filers
in advance what judge will be assigned.293 In a system that rotates the
assignment of judges in a predictable order, the strategist has merely
to observe which judge was assigned to the previous case or cases to
know which judge will be assigned to the next case filed.294 In a system
that assigns cases randomly, the strategist typically looks for situa-
tions in which the judge it seeks to avoid is removed from the draw
temporarily because of vacation, illness, imbalance in already as-
signed cases, or some other reason. Often, the chief judge of the court
288. See, e.g., Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 271, at 968 (finding, based on an empirical
study, that forum shopping was rampant in the bankruptcies of large, public companies from
1980 to 1997); id. at 1000 (concluding that venue correction occurred in only about 5% of those
cases); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 284, at 24-26 (describing forum shopping in specific
cases).
289. See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen, Frankel May Surrender, as a Deal Is Expected, WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 1999, at C1 (noting that Samuel D. Sheinbein, accused of murder in the United States,
successfully defeated United States venue for his murder trial by obtaining Israeli citizenship
based on the fact that his father was born in the territory that became Israel).
290. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995) (reporting that federal court plaintiffs lose a signifi-
cantly larger percentage of transferred cases than they lose of all cases).
291. See, e.g., No Judge-Shopping Allowed, NAT’L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A8 (reporting that an
attorney paid sanctions of $7,500 for filing 13 lawsuits, then withdrawing all but one in a case
involving Dr. Jack Kevorkian); Randall Samborn, Chicago Judge Sanctions Firm, NAT’L L.J.,
Apr. 18, 1994, at A4 (reporting that a judge sanctioned Mayer, Brown & Platt lawyers for filing
five identical complaints in an attempt to draw one of three judges).
292. See, e.g., Mark Ballard, Biggest Little Court in Texas: Plaintiffs Flock to Texarkana with
Billion-Dollar Suits, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 30, 1999, at A1, A10 (noting the filing of numerous large
cases in the Texarkana, Texas, federal court to get Judge David Folsom and referring to the
technique as “pinpoint forum shopping”).
293. See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE, PUBLIC
COMPANIES 40-41 (1997) (reporting the Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s practice of advising pro-
spective filers of the name of the judge who would be assigned to the case when filed).
294. See, e.g., WEYRAUCH, supra note 211, at 225 n.17 (“The attorneys hang around in the
clerk’s office until the proper letter is about to come up. As soon as this happens, they file their
complaints.”).
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has the authority to bypass the random assignment system, opening
the way for political corruption.295 Strategists may file several identical
cases, and then dismiss all but the one assigned to the desired judge.296
In more sophisticated versions of the same strategy, the strategist files
only a single case in the court, observes the assignment, and then de-
cides whether to go forward or dismiss. If the strategist chooses dis-
missal, the strategist may later file in the same court or file in a differ-
ent court. Other variations are possible.297
Strategists can also select courts—and thereby select more favor-
able panels of judges—by changing the nature of the relief they re-
quest. For example, wealthier taxpayers can avoid the notoriously
pro-government judges of the tax court298 by paying the tax and then
suing for a refund in the United States district court. In the Texaco-
Pennzoil example with which this Article began, Pennzoil tested the
waters in Delaware by filing for injunctive relief, and then changed
judges  by  dismissing  that  action  and  filing  for  money  damages  in
Texas, before having New York judges imposed on them by Texaco’s
filings in New York federal and bankruptcy courts.299
6. Settlement strategies. The conventional view considers the
settlement of cases a means of reaching approximately the same
result litigation would reach, but at less expense. The concept is
295. See, e.g., Pete Yost, Custom Broken in Cases Tied to President; Judge Picks Clinton Ap-
pointees to Preside, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1999, at A13 (revealing that the chief judge of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia bypassed the random assignment sys-
tem to steer cases against friends of President Clinton to judges appointed by President
Clinton).
296. This form of shopping is considered unethical, even in the absence of any rule violation.
See Samborn, supra note 291.
297. For example, if a similar case anywhere in the United States has been assigned to a
sympathetic judge, later filers can seek assignment to the same judge on the ground that their
case is related to that one. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, N.Y.’s Judge-shopping Channel, NAT’L L.J.,
July 26, 1999, at A4 (asserting that tobacco and gun plaintiffs are flocking to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York to seek related-to assignments to Judge
Jack B. Weinstein).
298. See Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal by the Federal
Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985,
998 (1991) (showing, in an empirical study, that the government won 70.5% of district court tax
cases and 90.4% of tax court cases in the same period).
299. See supra Part I.A.; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 24 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (objecting to “the odor of impermissible forum shopping which pervades
this case”).
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crystallized in Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser’s memorable
phrase “bargaining in the shadow of the law.”300
Settlement is, however, more than just an amicable resolution of
a dispute. It is a complex, often adversarial process with its own
norms, procedures, strategies, and range of possible outcomes. Set-
tlement strategies can include the arguing of facts that would be in-
admissible at trial or of legal theories that would have little chance of
winning in court, the making of threats that would be considered ex-
tortionate in any other context, and the substituting of what the par-
ties really want for the remedies the legal system offers.
Settlement can generate outcomes that lie entirely outside the
range of possible outcomes from litigation. The operative leverages
may result from the court’s restrictions on continuing the litigation301
or from the consequences of continuing aside from the ultimate deci-
sion.302 For example, the litigant who can credibly threaten to embar-
rass the opposing party in the course of the litigation—perhaps by
discovering facts that then become part of the public record—may be
able to settle for more money than the litigant could win in court.303
Similarly, the litigant may threaten an opponent with disclosure of
business strategies or as-yet unpublicized vulnerabilities. An adverse
result in litigation may have consequences that extend far beyond the
specific matter in issue. Loss of a civil suit may lead to a criminal in-
dictment. The filing of a civil action may bring the plaintiff’s or the
defendant’s conduct to the attention of law enforcement agencies.304
300. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) (focusing on the role of law in divorce proceed-
ings outside of the courtroom).
301. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 306, 312 (1986) (“One can in fact define managerial judging as the selective impo-
sition by judges of costs on lawyers for the purpose of rationing the use of procedures available
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
302. See, e.g., Karen Donovan, Class Action War Heats Up, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 22, 1997, at A1
(asserting that companies often felt compelled to settle securities class action strike suits to
avoid embarrassment).
303. See id.
304. See HARR, supra note 9, at 491-92 (describing how bitter, unsuccessful civil litigation
over several years generated a record of environmental abuses that then made action by the
EPA feasible). Consider this additional example. The wife of a law student may threaten to ex-
pose his use of cocaine in a divorce action. Because the law student must disclose the divorce
case in his application for Bar membership, if the wife were to make this allegation on the rec-
ord in the divorce action, the Bar would be likely to discover it. At minimum, the allegation
would delay the law student’s admission to the Bar. Rather than take the chance, the law stu-
dent in this situation may choose to accede to the wife’s demands in the divorce action. While
the wife’s threat may constitute the crime of extortion, skilled counsel will raise it in an indirect
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One plaintiff’s success in an obscure lawsuit may cause an avalanche
of such suits by others. Settlement of the initial case prior to filing
may have enhanced value because it could prevent such occurrences.
Commentators generally consider the settlement process harm-
less because they assume that parties are free to refuse a settlement
that gives them less than they think they would win at trial.305 The as-
sumption is incorrect. Some judges attempt to “encourage” settle-
ment of their cases through implicit threats of retaliation against re-
calcitrant parties, and thus make it virtually impossible for those
parties to continue to litigate.306 Though the written law may give the
parties the right to refuse to discuss settlement, the party who actually
refuses may suffer retaliation from the court.307 Once the party is
forced into negotiations by this threat, the party will encounter other
norms, such as those requiring the party to divulge aspects of its case
that would otherwise be confidential.
In multiparty litigation, settlement norms may be enforced by
strategic alliances among parties. For example, strategic alliances are
generally regarded as important determinants of recoveries—by liti-
manner that leaves no basis for prosecution. For example, the wife’s counsel may advise the
husband’s counsel that the wife insists on making the accusation, but that the wife’s counsel is
trying to dissuade her because of the risk that the matter might come to the attention of the Bar.
305. For example, Professor Alexander states:
The implicit message of the economic model is that we do not need to be concerned
about the high proportion of cases that are settled because the outcomes of settled
cases approximate the positions the parties would have occupied after a trial on the
merits. One could also arrive at this conclusion from the fact that the parties must
consent to a settlement. A party who believes trial would produce a more attractive
outcome than a particular settlement proposal can simply refuse the offer and go to
trial. The ability of either party to force a trial by refusing to agree to an unfavorable
settlement thus should drive settlements toward expected trial outcomes. Therefore,
settlements should be at least as substantively accurate as trials.
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 502 (1991).
306. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?—The Civil Appeals
Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 755 (1986) (noting that “settlements are neither dictated
nor even necessarily driven by statutes and stare decisis”); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Struc-
tural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 78
(1995) (“The combination of managerial and substantive decision-making powers provides dis-
trict judges with powerful leverage during the pretrial phase. Judges can use their power over
substantive decision-making to coerce settlements and intimidate counsel into abandoning liti-
gation theories or defenses.”).
307. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?—The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role
in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 49 (1994) (“Additionally, because of a ‘judicial zeal for set-
tlement,’ the increased opportunity for abuse may lead to judges punishing parties and lawyers
who fail to cooperate in settlement.”).
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gation or negotiation—in large bankruptcy reorganization cases.308
The party who fails to accede to settlement norms—such as the norm
that everybody at the table gets something, regardless of legal enti-
tlement—may find itself excluded from key alliances.309 The power of
these alliances derives in part from the fact that if the case comes be-
fore the court with all parties in agreement except one, that one is
likely to be overruled.310
IV.  IMPLICATIONS
The theory of legal strategy we present here is capable of ex-
plaining several phenomena for which current explanations are in-
adequate or nonexistent. 
A. The Effect of Superior Lawyering on Legal Outcomes
By the conventional view—made manifest both in bar examina-
tions and judicial opinions—law is an extensive set of instructions to
courts on how to decide cases.311 Those instructions are necessarily in-
complete in some respects and ambiguous in others. But the instruc-
tions are sufficient to render most cases “easy.”312 The judge’s task in
the remaining cases is to select the best result by resolving the ambi-
308. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing
U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J.
267, 318 (1994) (“The outcome [of a financial restructuring] depends not only on the substantive
rights of the parties, but also on the process through which the parties address the restructuring
problem, the order in which the issues are considered, and the particular alliances that form.”).
One such norm is that every constituency at the bargaining table gets something, even if that
constituency has not even an arguable entitlement to anything under the applicable law. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 154 (1990)
(“Rather, the outcomes of these negotiations are significantly determined by the social norms of
the legal culture which has grown up around these kinds of cases.”).
309. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1507-08 (explaining this inclusion as a result of the
shared mental model).
310. In the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, public companies, nearly all objections to
confirmation are unsuccessful. About 96% of cases result in confirmation of a plan, and that
virtually always occurs in the first hearing on confirmation. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 597, 600 (1993) (finding confirmation of reorganization in 69 out of 72 cases –
a 96% rate).
311. See, e.g., 1 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 7, at 316-17 (describing the tradi-
tional view as the “positivist frame”).
312. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 413 (“Following the law is a legal event, and the vast ma-
jority of these legal events are easy cases.”).
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guity in light of social conditions and other factors. Were this tradi-
tional view correct, lawyers could, in most cases, look up the law be-
fore litigation and predict those cases’ outcomes. Only rarely could
the quality of lawyering change those outcomes.
Observations of the legal system in operation suggest that the
quality of lawyering is highly correlated with success. The theory we
have presented explains why. Legal outcomes are the products of
complex human interactions in which the lawyer can draw not just on
written law, but on social norms and prejudices, the law in action, the
law in lawyers’ heads, informal rules of factual inference, apparent
system imperatives, community expectations regarding legal out-
comes, and virtually anything else that might persuade the decision-
maker.313 Strategy can constrain judges and other decisionmakers—or
replace them altogether. No a priori limits on this process exist, in or
outside of the law. The strategic possibilities are almost limitless,
which accounts for the importance of creativity and imagination on
the part of the strategist.314 The skilled strategist knows that one can
no more predict the outcome of a case from the facts and the law than
one can predict the outcome of a game of chess from the positions of
the pieces and the rules of the game. In either case, one needs to
know who is playing.
B. The Strategic Transformation of Law
In the conventional view, the common law evolves according to
the policy choices or “insight” of judges.315 The alternative view—that
litigants drive changes in the law—has been argued principally by
Professors Galanter and Macaulay in the law-and-society literature316
and principally by Professors Rubin and Bailey in the law-and-
economics literature.317 In Galanter and Macaulay’s theories, the
313. See supra Parts II.A-B.
314. See, e.g., 1 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 7, at 1046-50 (noting that creativity in
the formulation of legal strategy can translate a client’s “hopelessly confused and uncertain”
situation into a claim that will “win the respectful attention of community decision makers”).
315. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 107, at 275 (assuming that judges control the evolution of
the law).
316. See supra Part III.B.1.
317. See Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994) (proposing that the law is driven by the preferences of attorneys, not
judges or litigants); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51
(1977) (arguing that parties with a continuing interest in the establishment of efficient rules will
invest resources to overturn inefficient results); see also Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser,
Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (1980)
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mechanisms of change are essentially case selection.318 Although Ru-
bin and Bailey have compiled impressive empirical evidence in sup-
port of their position,319 they have not specified mechanisms by which
litigants can substitute their own views for the views of judges.320
Our theory of legal strategy suggests an additional, and we think,
more powerful, mechanism by which litigants can change the law. The
mechanism has essentially three stages. In the first, the litigant suc-
ceeds in bringing about a result that is contrary to expectations and
conventional understanding of the written law.
In the second stage, others similarly situated copy the successful
strategy. This copying is problematic. Successful legal strategy is not
always recognizable as such; indeed, it is generally more effective
when it goes unnoticed. But the moves that execute the strategy are
usually disclosed in public hearings or on public records. Careful ob-
servers can piece them together. Even strategies never publicly dis-
closed or admitted are nearly always in some manner revealed to suf-
ficiently observant opponents.
At this second stage, the decisionmakers or other defenders of
the status quo may attempt to neutralize the strategy. If they succeed,
the strategy dies. They may fail, however, for a variety of reasons.
The legal system relies on certain basic principles that are widely
known and virtually impossible to change.321 Those principles cannot
be abandoned simply to deny the strategist’s victory. Practical diffi-
(“Litigants try to win their cases, not increase the law’s efficiency, but the former may result in
the latter.”). If litigation can improve the law, it must be able to change it.
318. See supra Part III.B.1.
319. See Rubin & Bailey, supra note 317, at 817-21 (linking the rejection of the privity doc-
trine to the rate of increase in the number of lawyers and noting efforts to link plaintiffs’ law
reform efforts through litigation groups).
320. Professors Rubin and Bailey principally show that plaintiffs’ lawyers are organized and
motivated toward law reform favorable to their interests. They assert that those efforts result in
favorable precedents. See id. at 808 (“This is our basic hypothesis: The shape of modern product
liability law is due to the interests of tort lawyers.”). But they make only vague references to
means by which those motivations and efforts could generate precedents in spite of the contrary
views of judges. See, e.g., id. at 816 (“[A]s each individual attorney’s cases become stronger [as a
result of membership in the litigation group] the chance of favorable precedents also in-
creases.”); id. at 813 (alluding to the lawyer’s ability to choose the state in which to bring suit,
but not discussing how that could affect outcomes); id. at 810 (asserting that “[t]he plaintiff will
fight very hard for such a decision, while the defendant will not resist much[,]” but not explain-
ing why fighting hard would matter).
321. See LoPucki, supra note 254, at 8-13 (describing the nine basic principles on which the
liability system is constructed and which serve as the foundation for judgment-proof structures).
These principles are not law, but deeper understandings as to the operation of society: that a
person can own property is an example.
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culties in making a necessary distinction may prevent the system from
making an exception directed against the strategist.
Consider the example of a strategist who creates a judgment-
proof business to engage in hazardous activity. To avoid exposing as-
sets to the liability likely to be generated, the strategist rents both
plant and equipment at arms length, sells its products only for cash,
and distributes earnings to shareholders frequently. In an action by an
injured plaintiff, a court might like to defeat the strategy by subjecting
the plant and equipment to later judgments against the strategist. The
court cannot, however, hold leased plant and equipment generally
subject to the claims of tort creditors, because such a basic change in
principles would disrupt the plant and equipment leasing industries.
Nor can the court make an exception applicable only to strategists
who deliberately judgment-proof their businesses. All uses of limited
liability are deliberate, and every case in which the exception could be
at issue is one in which the debtor ultimately had insufficient assets to
pay the tort creditors. The court must allow the strategist to win, be-
cause if it does not, the court finds itself on a slippery slope that leads
to massive social change.322 The ultimate problem is the inability of
the courts to make certain kinds of decisions with sufficient reliability.
Unreliable rules or standards generate uncertainty that ultimately
creates anxiety and interferes with planning. The legal system must
draw lines where it can, which is not always where it thinks best. If the
decisionmaker cannot defeat the strategy at this second stage, the
strategy changes the pattern of case outcomes.
At the third stage, the legal system recognizes the triumph of the
strategy by changing the written law to make it consistent with the
case outcomes.323 The system does so to eliminate the expense and
322. See id. at 8 (noting that the court will tolerate considerable amounts of unintended stra-
tegic activity because of the trauma involved in making basic changes). Working from an eco-
nomic perspective, Professor Basu offers an alternative explanation of the court’s inability to
effectuate the written rule: “If a certain outcome is not an equilibrium of the economy, then it
cannot be implemented through any law.” Basu, supra note 21, at 22.
323. In the example of judgment-proofing presented here, the short-term result of acquies-
cence is that judgment-proofing succeeds; but the long-term result is an even more massive so-
cial change: the liability system fails. See LoPucki, supra note 254, at 4 (arguing that the ability
to enforce a money judgment is essential to the system of liability, and that liability is essential
to enforce American law). Judges occasionally acknowledge their lack of omnipotence over le-
gal outcomes. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973) (giving as one reason
for abolishing the rule of contributory negligence in Florida that juries may have been handing
down compromise verdicts in violation of their duty to apply the rule).
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embarrassment to the system of the strategic activity and the disparity
in outcomes between strategists and nonstrategists.
Another example may help in understanding this process of
transformation. Nineteenth-century law recognized no method by
which a corporate debtor could continue to operate its business with-
out paying its debts as they became due—a process currently referred
to as “bankruptcy reorganization.”324 Strategists representing corpo-
rate debtors forced the development of such a process.325 As Professor
Skeel described it:
In a pattern that reorganization lawyers perfected through time, the
[debtor] railroad would arrange for a friendly creditor (generally an
out-of-state creditor, to create federal diversity jurisdiction) to file a
creditor’s bill asking for the appointment of a receiver. Rather than
preparing to liquidate assets, as a creditor’s bill contemplated, the
receivers, who generally included members of the [debtor’s] man-
agement, worked out the terms of a reorganization. At the same
time, the [debtor’s] investment bankers formed bondholder “protec-
tive committees” and attempted to persuade the bondholders to de-
posit their securities with the committee, which would commit the
bondholders to the terms of the eventual reorganization. Once eve-
rything was in place, the bonds and other security interests were
foreclosed and the [debtor’s] assets were “sold” in a foreclosure sale.
In reality, the “sale” simply effected a reorganization of the rail-
road’s capital structure.326
The foreclosure sale theoretically was an exposure of the com-
pany to the market—anyone could have bought it. But in reality, the
process was closed. Only the purchaser organized by the insiders
could bid because the insiders had unique knowledge of the business,
some of the relationships necessary to continue the business may have
been personal relationships of the insiders, and the insiders manipu-
lated the timing of the proceedings to their own advantage. Sale by
the receiver for less than the amount owing to the creditors left the
creditors with less than the full amounts owing to them, yet permitted
the shareholder-insiders to remain in ownership and control in their
324. Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238,
1250-53 (1981) (describing the evolution of bankruptcy reorganization).
325. See David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1356 (1998) (“In effect, managers and their advisers took
creditors’ state law debt collection remedies and turned them inside out to fit the needs of trou-
bled railroads.”).
326. Id. at 1356-57 (footnotes omitted).
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role as purchasers at the foreclosure sale. The “reorganization” thus
accomplished was a result superior to piecemeal liquidation,327 but the
courts undoubtedly would have preferred to have the reorganization
without insider dominance. The strategists had, however, eliminated
that possibility by being the only ones in a position to bid. Even
though a good case might have been made that the insiders were
usurping corporate opportunities in breach of their fiduciary duties,
the courts had no practical alternative to approval of the proposed
sale to the insiders.
After a period in which these equity receiverships enabled insid-
ers to remain in control through a process that reduced the claims of
creditors, Congress enacted a bankruptcy reorganization law designed
to recognize and regulate the reorganization process.328 An early ver-
sion, Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, attempted to eliminate in-
sider domination by requiring the appointment of a trustee in every
case.329 Strategists for the insiders responded by filing their cases un-
der Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act—in violation of the written
law—and negotiating.330 In the Bankruptcy Code adopted in 1978,
Congress acknowledged its inability to contain the insiders’ strategy331
327. See Clark, supra note 324, at 1252 (“This procedure made economic sense whenever
there were no or few potential outside buyers with accurate and timely information about the
true state of affairs and the future prospects of the business, and when the process of searching
for and informing outside buyers would itself be very expensive.”).
328. See id. at 1253 (“The fifth and final phase in the development of corporate debtor-
creditor law involved the formal establishment of a bankruptcy reorganization law that offered a
more structured version of the transformed equity receivership.”).
329. See David G. Epstein & Christopher Fuller, Chapters 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code—Observations on Using Case Authority from One of the Chapters in Proceedings Under
the Other, 38 VAND. L. REV. 901, 925 (1985) (“In Chapter X . . . the court appointed a trustee in
every case.”).
330. As experts familiar with the process described it to Professor Elizabeth Warren:
[M]ost publicly traded companies entering bankruptcy initially filed in Chapter XI.
The company then struggled with the SEC and negotiated with its various creditors to
try to devise a consensual plan. If the SEC was persuaded that the public interest
would be better served by the flexibility offered by Chapter XI, and if no reason ex-
isted to toss out current management, the case remained in Chapter XI. If the SEC,
the debtor, and the major creditors could not agree, the SEC would seek an order
from the bankruptcy court to convert the company’s filing to a Chapter X, or the
creditors might seek to liquidate the company in a straight bankruptcy.
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 454 (1992).
331. The official justification for eliminating the requirement of the appointment of a trustee
in the bankruptcy of every publicly-held company was that “debtors [would] avoid the reorgani-
zation provisions in the [Code] until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy.”
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 231 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6191 (footnotes omit-
ted).
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and gave them broad reign.332 Bankruptcy law now formally recog-
nizes a right in the owner-managers of a debtor corporation to remain
in ownership and control through a reorganization proceeding spe-
cifically designed to reduce the corporation’s debts.333
Additional examples of strategic transformation of law abound.
During the late 1980s, aggressive debtors’ lawyers changed the terms
on which consumer debtors could adjust their debts under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to the change, the conventional wis-
dom held debtors to a choice between the relief available under
Chapter 7 (discharge of all debt, without the necessity to make pay-
ments to unsecured creditors) and the relief available under Chapter
13 (the ability to save the debtor’s home from foreclosure, but only on
the condition of paying all of the debtor’s disposable income to unse-
cured creditors for a period of three years). Almost a decade after
adoption of the legislative scheme, strategists invented a method for
circumventing this choice that became known as a “Chapter 20”—a
Chapter 7 case promptly followed by a second filing under Chapter
13.334 By discharging his or her debts in Chapter 7 before filing the
Chapter 13 case, the debtor assured that the “price” of Chapter 13 re-
lief—payments to unsecured creditors—would be zero. Apparently
unwilling to read into the statute words that were not there, the Su-
preme Court permitted a Chapter 20 case to stand, thereby putting its
imprimatur on the change the strategists had effected.335
Finally, attorney Lincoln Brooks has developed a strategy that
gives business debtors what is generally viewed as the most important
advantage of a bankruptcy filing—the ability to stay and bind dis-
senting creditors—without having to file bankruptcy.336 Prior to
Brooks’s strategy, the conventional wisdom held that “dissenting
creditors cannot be bound in a workout, but they can be bound in
332. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994) (“[A] debtor in possession shall have all the rights . . .
and powers . . . of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.”); id. § 1108 (“Unless the court,
on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, orders otherwise, the [debtor’s
pre-bankruptcy management] may operate the debtor’s business.”).
333. Accord Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership,
526 U.S. 434, 458 (1999) (requiring exposure to the market as a condition of continued owner-
ship and control).
334. For a more complete description of the problem and the strategists’ solution, see Lo-
Pucki, supra note 30, at 1533-37.
335. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 80 (1991) (holding that a mortgage lien
can be rescheduled under Chapter 13 even after the personal obligation secured by the mort-
gaged property has been discharged under Chapter 7).
336. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1539-41.
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Chapter 11.”337 Brooks’s strategy is to grant a security interest in all of
the debtors’ assets to the Credit Managers’ Association as trustee for
all of the unsecured creditors. If a dissenting creditor attempts to levy,
Brooks opposes the levy on the novel ground that it violates the
newly minted secured creditors’ right to priority. Though the case is
weak on the written law, it is normatively strong and appealing from a
systems standpoint. Brooks can argue that a few dissenting creditors
should not be able to overturn the efforts of the majority to negotiate
a solution to the company’s financial problems. That appeal, com-
bined with favorable economics of litigation, has enabled Brooks to
win about fifty consecutive cases. Other lawyers have adopted similar
techniques, thereby changing the delivered law.338
In each of these instances, the decision to make a change in how
things were done was not made by a judge or a legislature, but by a
strategist working on behalf of a party. Perhaps sufficiently deter-
mined judges or legislatures could have reversed the outcomes—if not
in the cases where the strategies were first employed, at least in later
cases. But even that is not clear. Legal strategy exploits vulnerabilities
of the existing system. Comprehensive identification of these vulner-
abilities is beyond the scope of this Article. Almost certainly among
them, however, are (1) the inability of the system reliably to make de-
sired distinctions, (2) the deliberate retention of “flexibility” in the le-
gal system on the theory that it is necessary to accommodate change,
(3) the lack of any social consensus as to the appropriate fora for the
resolution of legal disputes, and (4) the diffusion of decisionmaking
power among tens of thousands of judges in the United States alone.
Vulnerabilities such as these give rise to the indeterminacies that legal
strategists exploit.
C. Explaining Local Legal Cultures
Written law purports to be universal within geographical
boundaries.339 Because the same law applies throughout each jurisdic-
tion, the conventional view suggests that legal outcomes should be
337. MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 14 (1996).
338. For a more complete description of the problem and the strategists’ solution, see Lo-
Pucki, supra note 30, at 1537-41.
339. Federal law purports to govern all transactions or occurrences within the United States
and each state’s law purports to govern transactions or occurrences throughout the respective
state.
LOPUCKI.DOC 10/12/00 1:11 PM
2000] A THEORY OF LEGAL STRATEGY 1479
uniform throughout each as well. Empirical research, however, has
repeatedly discovered large variations in legal outcomes from place to
place within jurisdictions, a phenomenon referred to as “local legal
culture.”340 The mystery is why and how these systematic variations in
legal outcome occur from one part of a jurisdiction to another when
the law that supposedly generates them is the same.
The answers lie in the fact that several of the factors we have
identified—social norms, the law in lawyers’ heads, and expectations
regarding outcomes—are not uniform within the neat boundaries of
legal jurisdiction. They are forged by frequent interactions among
members of groups. The locations of these groups are rarely coexten-
sive with the city, state, or national boundaries that define the reach
of legal doctrine. Because social norms, the law in lawyers’ heads, and
expectations regarding outcomes are oral traditions, they may have
little credibility to outsiders and little effect outside the group. The
law in lawyers’ heads may be different from city to city, or city to ru-
ral area, yet the same throughout national or international groups
whose members interact frequently. Social norms exist within virtu-
ally every group of people who interact repeatedly, from the citizens
of a nation to the members of a family.341 They differ by religion, race,
interests, geographical location, occupation, institution, and any other
factor that brings groups together.
340. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J.
166, 181 (1978) (referring to “a stable set of expectations, practices and informal rules of be-
havior which, for want of a better term, we have called ‘local legal culture’”); Thomas W.
Church, Jr., Examining Local Legal Culture, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 449, 451 (referring to
“the practitioner norms governing case handling and participant behavior in a criminal court”).
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook define local legal culture as follows:
systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a
complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials in
a particular locality, and differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions,
and expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal le-
gal regime.
Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence
From the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 804 (1994).
The writers cited here do not attempt to describe comprehensively the nature of the
“practices, perceptions and expectations” that constitute local legal culture, but we think they
are the same ones we identify here. For a recent attempt to describe the mechanisms of legal
culture, see generally LoPucki, supra note 30.
341. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30-33 (1983) (describing social norms in various religious sects,
company towns, and other non-sectarian settings); Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 124, at 395;
Walter O. Weyrauch, The “Basic Law” or “Constitution” of a Small Group, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES
49, 56-58 (1971) (depicting the evolution of law when a group of Berkeley students were ex-
perimentally locked in a penthouse for three months).
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Such differences explain, at least in part, the processes by which
local legal cultures arise, change, and disappear. The cultures are con-
stantly in flux because the underlying factors that give rise to them
are in flux. Through legal strategy, changes in social norms and expec-
tations are translated into changes in legal outcomes, even while the
written law remains constant. These changes in outcomes vary from
place to place within a jurisdiction and change abruptly over time for
the simple reason that the factors producing them, including legal
strategies, change. If local legal cultures were merely the products of
general cultural differences from place to place—the general prac-
tices, perceptions, and expectations of the people who live in a com-
munity—they could not appear and disappear nearly as quickly as
they do.342
D. Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead
The theories we present here extend Professor Galanter’s theory
as to why the “haves” come out ahead, by explaining new means by
which spending more resources343 on litigation can produce more fa-
vorable outcomes for the spenders. If law operated in accord with
conventional legal theory, resources would affect results only in the
small minority of cases in which determinative facts remained undis-
covered or the result specified by law was unclear. Yet, resources con-
sistently produce good or acceptable results in what had seemed to be
the most hopeless of cases.
Resources matter because they unleash strategy, and strategy is
capable of altering legal outcomes across a wide range of possibilities.
Adverse legal doctrine defeats only those who believe it can. For
nonbelievers, the strategic application of resources can construct out-
342. For example, when Chief District Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. in 1997 took the unprece-
dented step of withdrawing the automatic reference of Delaware bankruptcy cases to the bank-
ruptcy court and personally taking over the assignment of Chapter 11 cases filed in Delaware,
the proportion of large Chapter 11 cases filed in Delaware instantly fell from 86% to almost
zero. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 271, at 986 (reporting that only a single large, pub-
licly held company filed for bankruptcy in the United States during the five months following
Judge Farnan’s order). Conventional legal theory would have predicted no change in filing rates
because the newly assigned judges would be bound to follow the same law and procedures as
the old.
343. We use the term “resources” rather than “money” in recognition of the fact that law-
yers may devote their time to particular cases for ideological reasons—pro bono work—and or-
ganizations may sponsor litigation for ideological reasons, such as a foundation sponsoring liti-
gation to protect the environment. In either case, the effect is the fundamentally the same as an
expenditure of the parties’ own money.
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comes to order, within cultural limits. The more resources the party
can spend, the better the outcomes the party is likely to get.
That does not mean that the party with greater resources will
prevail—or even have an advantage—in every case. The resources
that a party can profitably spend on a case are limited by the value of
the case to that party. It follows that if a case involves only money—
as many commercial disputes do—neither party should be willing to
spend more than the amount in issue. Of course, if one of the parties
is not sufficiently liquid, that party may not be able to invest optimally
in the case. In addition, a given level of expenditure by opposing sides
in a given case may do more for one side than the other, as where one
side is a frequent litigator and can reap economies of scale.
If the dispute is over a nonmonetary right—the validity of a pat-
ent or the right to control a corporation—the win may be worth more
to party A than to party B. The party with more to gain can probably
cost-justify larger expenditures than the opposing party, giving the
former an advantage in the litigation. This clash of strategists might
have some tendency toward efficiency because the party that places a
higher value on a favorable outcome is more likely to get it.344 But for
strategy to be “efficient” in the economic sense, its tendency toward
efficiency would have to be greater than the tendency toward effi-
ciency of the other systems that might be adopted. That seems un-
likely, because strategy is of greatest use in cases that the legal system
would otherwise regard as nonmeritorious. The types of cases in
which Professor Galanter initially propounded his theory of why the
“haves” come out ahead—cases in which the “haves” are repeat play-
ers but their opponents are not—fall within this class.
Probably few legal disputes are simply over money. Among those
that are, settlement usually produces a better result for both sides.
The cases that go to litigation tend to be either cases in which emo-
tional investments are high and parties are interested not only in what
344. Scholars have proposed a number of theories under which law evolves toward effi-
ciency. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 235-36 (1979) (discussing private and public judicial systems from an eco-
nomic standpoint); Rubin, supra note 317, at 51 (showing that the “efficient rule situation”
noted by Posner is due to an “evolutionary mechanism whose direction proceeds from the utility
maximizing decisions of disputants rather than from the wisdom of judges”); R. Peter Terre-
bonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397, 398, 404 (1981)
(looking to evolutionary analysis from biology to support “the proposition that inefficient legal
rules are litigated more frequently than efficient ones”). But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the
Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 584 (1992) (noting that Richard Posner has shifted
the basis for his theory of common law efficiency).
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benefit they can win but also in what harm they can inflict on others,
or cases the parties believe will establish important precedents. The
responsiveness of the legal process to infusions of resources will tend
to give the “haves” advantages over the “have nots” in these cases.345
As discussed above, innuendo—the oblique allusion to matters
that must remain unarticulated—is a principal skill of lawyer-
strategists. Some lawyers will be better at it than others. That may oc-
cur because they have superior linguistic skills generally, or a better
understanding of what can be left unsaid with the particular deci-
sionmaker. This difference in skill level inures to the benefit of those
who can afford the best advocates. Though that is generally the
wealthier side, because of the contingency fee system it is far from in-
variably so.
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
In the conventional model of the legal process, the lawyers pres-
ent the facts of a case and the governing law to the judge. The judge
applies the law to the facts to reach a decision. If the decision is
wrong, the losing party can appeal to a higher court that will set it
right. Settlements can, and usually do, occur along the way, but these
settlements are merely estimates or approximations of the results the
courts would otherwise reach. No room exists within that model for
legal strategy.
The alternative model we have presented is a more open-ended
one. When the stakes are sufficiently large, lawyers assume the role of
strategists. They compete in the selection of decisionmakers from an
unlimited array of judges, arbitrators, private parties in settlement, or
other persons. They employ a wide variety of strategies to reach or
prevent adjudication. In the small minority of cases in which adjudica-
tion occurs, the strategists argue from a similarly wide variety of ma-
terials, which include social norms, law in action, law in lawyers’
heads, informal rules of factual inference, system imperatives, com-
munity expectations, public policy, and written law. Because adjudi-
cated outcomes depend so much on the predispositions of the adjudi-
cators and the strategies employed in presentations, those outcomes
differ widely from judge to judge, case to case, and place to place.
345. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764 (1977) (noting that the estate being liti-
gated all the way to the Supreme Court was worth only $2,500). When, as here, the resources
necessary to prosecute the case far exceed the amount in issue, the side most willing to spend
resources will have the advantage.
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Appeals are rare, and reversals even rarer. Strategy, not law, is the
principal determinant of outcomes.
Once the dominant role of legal strategy is accepted, some un-
doubtedly will defend it on the ground that the vulnerability of the
system to strategy gives the system an added measure of stability.
That is, the system bends to accommodate power. We argue, to the
contrary, that legal strategy renders legal outcomes unpredictable,
making the system less stable. To the extent that strategies determine
the outcomes of cases, the merits of cases as traditionally perceived
do not. The injustice causes disrespect for the legal system, which ul-
timately undermines its legitimacy.
Because legal strategies are attempts to manipulate the outcomes
of cases irrespective of their supposed merits under written law,
strategies are widely viewed as unethical. Lawyers are reluctant to
publicize the strategies they pursue partly for that reason. But an
even more important reason is that most lawyers understand that
strategies work best when unnoticed. Articulation can, and usually
does, render them ineffective. These factors combine to drive legal
strategy largely underground.
Some of the legal scholars who share our view of the ubiquity
and importance of legal strategy view the problem of legal strategy as
insoluble. Strategy, they say, permeates not only law, but life.346 No
matter what system is in place, strategists will attack it and transform
it into something other than what was intended.347
Though we generally agree with this view, we think it ignores a
key aspect of law-related systems:348 they differ in the degree of their
vulnerability to strategy. Better systems generate less strategic activ-
ity. That strategic activity is more likely to be of the kinds anticipated
or even intended by the systems’ designers. Strategies can still gain
advantage in the better systems, but they can gain less. Accordingly,
the first means we propose for reducing the impact of strategy on le-
346. See, e.g., conversation between Lynn M. LoPucki, Security Pacific Bank Professor of
Law, UCLA Law School; Theodore Eisenberg, Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell
Law School; and James A. Henderson, Jr., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School, Sept. 25, 1998.
347. See Farber, supra note 28, at 606 (“A certain amount of formalism is unavoidable. As a
result, the kind of moral risk dramatized by the story of the red-hot knife may be difficult to
eliminate from any legal system.”).
348. A “law-related system” is a system composed of people and objects in which formal law
plays a role. See LoPucki, supra note 129, at 488-97 (explaining the concept of a law-related sys-
tem).
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gal outcomes is to redesign the legal system to provide fewer incen-
tives for system-unintended strategy. 349
Articulation offers a second means for reducing the impact of
strategy on legal outcomes. The articulation need not be by partici-
pants in the case. Legal scholars can do it as well. Articulation will not
be easy. Because the strategist conceals the strategy, the articulation
is necessarily speculative, and therefore dangerous to the articulator.
Inevitably, some articulations will miss the mark. Moreover, articula-
tion operates largely by embarrassing the strategists, and, if it comes
from a third party, such as the press or an empirical researcher, may
also embarrass the judges and opposing lawyers who have been the
strategists’ unwitting victims. Thus none of the participants are typi-
cally willing to divulge information regarding the nature, use, or ef-
fects of strategy.
Articulation alone cannot solve the problem of legal strategy. Al-
though its application tends to neutralize the articulated strategy, the
effect is uncertain and usually incomplete. The court that receives a
case may be embarrassed by the articulation of a forum-shopping
strategy but not always enough to send the case back. The neutraliza-
tion of one strategy still leaves others effective.
In the coming age of information, the task of articulating legal
strategy may become easier. Computerization of the legal process—in
the courts, in lawyers’ offices, and in the offices of business and gov-
ernmental clients—is documenting the pattern of cases and outcomes.
Though such data generally does not capture the motives of partici-
pants and therefore does not document the strategies themselves, it
does capture the footprint of those strategies in the form of disparities
in legal outcomes from place to place, race to race, judge to judge,
and, perhaps soon, lawyer to lawyer.350
349. Not seeing this potential for improvement, most scholars condemn strategy as unethi-
cal, exhort lawyers to refrain from engaging in it, and attempt to ignore strategy in their theories
of the operation of the legal system. We consider their condemnations and exhortations ineffec-
tive and their attempt to ignore strategy misguided.
For example, Alan Schwartz recently chose to ground an elaborate theory of contract
bankruptcy on the assumption that “parties cannot contract in lending agreements to use a
bankruptcy system other than the one the state supplies.” Schwartz, supra note 108, at 1808.
Schwartz cites only case law for that proposition. See id. at 1808 n.6. In fact, legal strategists
have devised a number of means for contracting out of the state-supplied system. See LOPUCKI,
supra note 279, at 186-87 (describing four varieties of such strategies).
350. Scholars have done most of their computer-assisted analyses of the legal process to date
in databases that contain only legal opinions. Because legal opinions are non-systematic, self-
serving descriptions of the legal process by persons with vested interests, they are a relatively
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This development parallels one that has already had a profound
effect on the medical services delivery system. Data generated for a
variety of other purposes has been analyzed to show that medical
procedures employed and outcomes obtained differ sharply from
place to place and provider to provider.351 The effect has been to focus
attention on the causes of those differences.352
Legal scholars, working with the huge masses of electronic data
that have been accumulating in the legal system in recent years, may
soon be able to focus similar attention on legal strategy. The legal sys-
tem already has been profoundly affected by scholars’ documentation
of the relationship between defendants’ race and the imposition of
the death penalty,353 the rampant forum shopping in major business
bankruptcies,354 the nullification of securities class action reform by
the simple expedient of moving the litigation to another set of
courts,355 and the lack of relationship between formal circuit rules
governing the rules for publication of opinions and actual publication
practices.356
weak form of data. Nevertheless, studies of them have already revealed interesting patterns. See,
e.g., MARTHA G. DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 179-84, 195-96 (1996) (exposing a pattern of discourse
by prosecutors and courts that describe criminal defendants with metaphors of filth); Farole,
supra note 18 (showing that state governments win disproportionately in state supreme courts);
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as
Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379, 385-88 (1999) (showing that despite judicial rhetoric to
the contrary, piercing the corporate veil within a corporate group on behalf of a tort plaintiff is
extremely rare).
351. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen’s Second Revolution: A Sys-
tems/Strategic Perspective, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 62-64 (1999) (describing the system employed
to generate comparative provider statistics in the field of medicine).
352. See id. at 56, 63-64.
353. See, e.g., Weyrauch, supra note 177, at 803-07 (citing empirical data on race in capital
cases).
354. See, e.g., Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 271, at 968-69 (reporting rampant shopping
from 1980 to 1997); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 284, at 12 (reporting rampant shopping in
the 1980s).
355. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 302, at A1 (reporting that despite legislation designed to
reduce securities class actions, the volume of securities class actions filed in federal courts has
remained the same while the volume in state courts has increased).
356. See, e.g., Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 139, at 192-93 (arguing from empirical data
showing dramatically different use of judgment orders in different federal circuits that judges
engage in strategic behavior regarding publication of full opinions in hard cases).
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Data capable of documenting the effects of legal strategy on legal
outcomes already exists. Those who have it—principally the courts—
are not likely to surrender it easily in usable form.357 But as the data is
inevitably released, the existence and importance of legal strategy in
the generation of legal outcomes will become increasingly difficult to
deny. When that occurs, scholars, judges, and other participants will
be forced to acknowledge strategy’s dominant role in the legal proc-
ess.
357. See, e.g., Westbrook v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (Cal. App. 1994)
(barring release of court information in bulk electronic form, even though the information itself
was a matter of public record); Office of the State Court Adm’r v. Background Info. Serv., Inc.,
994 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1999) (holding that the courts are not subject to Colorado’s public records
law and barring release of court information in bulk electronic form); Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy
Accountability Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, H.R. 3146, Part IV, Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
154 (1998) (statement of Hon. Michael J. Kaplan, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, U.S. District Court
for the Western District of New York, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United
States) (opposing, on grounds of privacy, provisions that would have made it the policy of the
United States to release the public record portions of bankruptcy clerks’ databases in electronic
form).
